Schmechel v. Dille Clerk\u27s Record v. 2 Dckt. 35050 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-1-2008
Schmechel v. Dille Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 35050
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Schmechel v. Dille Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 35050" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2027.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2027
LA\fJ CLERK 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, ETAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
___________ am! 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, ETAL 
Defendant/Respondent 
___________ and 
Appealed from the District Court of the ______ _ 
Hon. 
Judicial Di<trict for the State of Idaho, in and 
TWIN FALLS 
for-------- County 
G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Jwiue 
David Com.stock 
Byron Foster 
Steven Hippler 
Keeley DUlro 
AttorneyA for Appellant_ 
Attorney_ for Respondent,_ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as) 
surviving spouse and Personal Representative ) 
of the Estate of Rosie Sclunechel, deceased ) 
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD ) 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, ) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN ) 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho ) 
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., ) 
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
CASE NO. CV 05-4345 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
VOLUME2 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEV AN 
David Comstock 
Byron Foster 
199 N Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P. 0. Box 2774 
Boise, ID 83701-2774 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
District Judge 
Steven Hippler 
J. Will Varin 
601 W, Bannock Street 
P. 0. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
r; ."\ !) 
l, \j . 
Table of Contents 
VOLUlVlE 1 
Clerk's Record on Appeal ..................................................................... , ..... , ...................... 1 
Table of Contents .............................................................................. , ............................. 2 
Index ........ , ........................................................................ ,, ......................................... 7 
Register of Action, Printed June 5, 2007 .............................................................................. 12 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Filed October 3, 2005 .................................................... 28 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Filed November 7, 2005 ................................... 37 
Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE: Motion Practice, 
Filed December 14, 2005 ......................................................... , ....................................... 42 
Defendant Thomas J, Byrne's Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
Filed January 5, 2006 ..................................................................................................... 51 
Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE: Motion Practice, 
Filed Febmary 15, 2006 .................................................................................................. 60 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, Filed March 2, 2006 ................................................... 69 
Notice of Jury Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference and Order Governing Further Proceedings, 
Filed March 9, 2006 ............. , ......................................................................................... 73 
Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, Filed June 18, 2007 ................................ 75 
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Shaiyene Shindle, Filed June 25, 2007 ....................... 81 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D., 
Filed June 27, 2007 ........................................................................................................ 84 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D., 
Filed June 27, 2007 ........................................................................................................ 87 
Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D. 
(Change of Location), Filed August 13, 2007 ....................................................................... 90 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Jim Keller, M.P.H., PA-C., 
Filed August 13, 2007 ..................................................................................................... 93 
Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D., 
Filed August 13, 2007 ..................................................................................................... 96 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed September 10, 2007 ................... 106 
Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed September 11, 2007 ..................... 112 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A. 's Exhibit List, Filed September 24, 2007 .................................... 117 
Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute Trial Exhibit List, 
Filed September 24, 2007 ............................................................................................... 124 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Trial Witness List, 
Filed September 24, 2007 ............................................................................................... 136 
Pretrial Conference Order Pursuant to I. R. C. P. 16( d), Filed September 25, 2007 ........................... 141 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed September 26, 2007 .......................................................... 149 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed September 26, 2007 ....................... 153 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A. 's Witness List, Filed September 26, 2007 ................................... 163 
Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' Motions in Limine, 
Filed September 28, 2007 ............................................................................................... 168 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 172 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Thomas Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 179 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, 
Filed October 4, 2007 .................................................................................................... 187 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Joinder in Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 197 
2 n? .. \) /.~ 
VOLUME2 
Clerk's Record on Appeal, Volume 2 ................................................................................. 200 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 201 
Index ......................................................................................................................... 206 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, Filed October 5, 2007 ...................... 211 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, 
Filed October 5, 2007 .................................................................................................... 228 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed October 5, 2007 ........................ 238 
Pretrial Memorandum, Filed October 9, 2007 ....................................................................... 243 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed October 9, 2007 ................... 257 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response 
to Defendants' Motions in Limine, Filed October 9, 2007 ........................................................ 263 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Joinder in Defendant Bryne's 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 9, 2007 ............................................................................ 272 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Proposed Special Verdict Form, Filed October 9, 2007 ............. 274 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Trial Brief, Filed October 9, 2007 ............................................... 281 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Joinder in Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, Filed October 10, 2007 ................. 302 
Defendants' Joint Exhibit List, Filed October 10, 2007 ........................................................... 305 
Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum RE: Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller, 
Filed October 12, 2007 .................................................................................................. 315 
Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum RE: Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller, 
Filed October 15, 2007 .................................................................................................. 321 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's First Supplemental Jury Instructions, 
Filed October 15, 2007 .................................................................................................. 327 
r, n '.) 
C. ~I J 
Order RE: Motions in Lirnine, Filed October 16, 2007 ............................................................ 330 
Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 18, 2007 .......................... 336 
Plaintiffs' Bench Brief RE: Proposed "Reckless" Jury Instruction, Filed October 19, 2007 ............... 346 
Plaintiffs' Objections to the Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 19, 2007 ............. 350 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 26, 2007 ....................... 359 
Defendants' Joint Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, 
Filed October 26, 2007 .................................................................................................. 364 
Defendants' Joint Objections to Court's Proposed Final Jury Instructions, 
Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................................................. 380 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Lipman, 
Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................................................. 386 
Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Objection to Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of 
Dr. Lipman, Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................................. 394 
VOLUME3 
Clerk's Record on Appeal, Volume 3 ................................................................................. 400 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 401 
Index ......................................................................................................................... 404 
Final Jury Instructions, Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................... .411 
Special Verdict Form, Filed October 30, 2007 ...................................................................... 443 
Judgment, Filed November 5, 2007 ................................................................................... 448 
Judgment, Filed November 9, 2007 ................................................................................... 450 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New for New Trial, Filed November 19, 2007 ......................................... .453 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, Filed November 19, 2007 .................. 456 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for New Trial, Filed December 3, 2007 .......... , ......................................................... 471 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, 
Filed December 13, 2007 ................................................................................................ 492 
Memorandum Opinion and Order RE: Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, 
Filed January 23, 2008 ................................................................................................... 502 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Defendants' Motions for Costs, 
Filed January 24, 2008 ................................................................................................... 531 
Amended Judgment, Filed February 14, 2008 ....................................................................... 546 
Notice of Appeal, Filed March 5, 2008 ............................................................................... 549 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Request for Additional Transcript and Record, 
Filed March 17, 2008 .................................................................................................... 555 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Request for Additional 
Transcripts and Records, Filed March 17, 2008 .......... , ......................................................... 562 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending the Appeal, 
Filed May 30, 2008 ....................................................................................................... 570 
Clerks' Certificate ......................................................................................................... 572 
Certificate of Exhibits .................................................................................................... 573 
Certificate of Service .................................... ,. .................................................................. . 
Index 
VOLUME 1 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Thomas Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 179 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D., 
Filed June 27, 2007 .................................................... , ................................................... 84 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Jim Keller, M.P.H., PA-C., 
Filed August 13, 2007 ..................................................................................................... 93 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D., 
Filed June 27, 2007 ........................................................................................................ 87 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Filed November 7, 2005 ................................... 37 
Clerk's Record on Appeal .................................................................................................. 1 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Filed October 3, 2005 .................................................... 28 
Defendant Clinton Dille, M. D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute Trial Exhibit List, 
Filed September 24, 2007 ............................................................................................... 124 
Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' Motions in Limine, 
Filed September 28, 2007 ............................................................................................... 168 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A. 's Exhibit List, Filed September 24, 2007 .................................... 117 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Joinder in Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 197 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Witness List, Filed September 26, 2007 ................................... 163 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
Filed January 5, 2006 ..................................................................................................... 51 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, 
Filed October 4, 2007 ........ : ........................................................................................... 187 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Trial Witness List, 
Filed September 24, 2007 ............................................................................................... 136 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 4, 2007 ............................................................................ 172 
Index ............................................................................................................................ 7 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed September 26, 2007 ....................... 153 
Notice of Jury Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference and Order Governing Further Proceedings, 
Filed March 9, 2006 ....................................................................................................... 73 
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Shaiyene Shindle, Filed June 25, 2007 ....................... 81 
Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE: Motion Practice, 
Filed December 14, 2005 ................................................................................................. 42 
Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE: Motion Practice, 
Filed February 15, 2006 .................................................................................................. 60 
Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, Filed June 18, 2007 ................................ 75 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed September 26, 2007 .......................................................... 149 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed September 10, 2007 ................... 106 
Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed September 11, 2007 ..................... 112 
Pretrial Conference Order Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d), Filed September 25, 2007 ........................... 141 
Register of Action, Printed June 5, 2007 .............................................................................. 12 
Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D., 
Filed August 13, 2007 ..................................................................................................... 96 
Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D. 
(Change of Location), Filed August 13, 2007 ........................................................................ 90 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, Filed March 2, 2006 .................................................... 69 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ 2 
207 
VOLUME2 
Clerk's Record on Appeal, Volume 2 ................................................................................. 200 
Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Objection to Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of 
Dr. Lipman, Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................................. 394 
Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Joinder in Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Proposed Special Verdict Form, Filed October 9, 2007 ............. 274 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, 
Filed October 5, 2007 .................................................................................................... 228 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Trial Brief, Filed October 9, 2007 ............................................... 281 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response 
to Defendants' Motions in Limine, Filed October 9, 2007 ........................................................ 263 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Joinder in Defendant Bryne's 
Motion in Limine, Filed October 9, 2007 ............................................................................ 272 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's First Supplemental Jury Instructions, 
Filed October 15, 2007 .................................................................................................. 327 
Defendants' Joint Exhibit List, Filed October 10, 2007 ........................................................... 305 
Defendants' Joint Objections to Court's Proposed Final Jury Instructions, 
Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................................................. 380 
Defendants' Joint Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, 
Filed October 26, 2007 .................................................................................................. 364 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Lipman, 
Filed October 30, 2007 .................................................................................................. 386 
Index ......................................................................................................................... 206 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, Filed October 5, 2007 ...................... 211 
Order RE: Motions in Limine, Filed October 16, 2007 ........................................................... 330 
208 
Plaintiffs' Bench Brief RE: Proposed "Reckless" Jnry Instruction, Filed October 19, 2007 ............... 346 
Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 18, 2007 .......................... 336 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed October 5, 2007 ........................ 238 
Plaintiffs' Objections to the Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 19, 2007 ............. 350 
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 26, 2007 ....................... 359 
Pretrial Memorandum, Filed October 9, 2007 ....................................................................... 243 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed October 9, 2007 ................... 257 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, Filed October 10, 2007 ................. 302 
Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum RE: Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller, 
Filed October 12, 2007 .................................................................................................. 315 
Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum RE: Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller, 
Filed October 15, 2007 .................................................................................................. 321 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 201 
VOLUME3 
Amended Judgment, Filed February 14, 2008 ....................................................................... 546 
Certificate of Exhibits .................................................................................................... 573 
Certificate of Service ..................................................................................................... 578 
Clerk's Record on Appeal, Volume 3 ................................................................................. 400 
Clerks' Certificate ......................................................................................................... 572 
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Request for Additional Transcript and Record, 
Filed March 17, 2008 .................................................................................................... 555 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for New Trial, Filed December 3, 2007 .................................................................... 471 
209 
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Request for Additional 
Transcripts and Records, Filed March 17, 2008 .................................................................... 562 
Final Jury Instructions, Filed October 30, 2007 ..................................................................... 411 
Index ......................................................................................................................... 404 
Judgment, Filed November 5, 2007 ................................................................................... 448 
Judgment, Filed November 9, 2007 .................................................................................. .450 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Defendants' Motions for Costs, 
Filed January 24, 2008 ................................................................................................... 531 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, Filed November 19, 2007 .................. 456 
Memorandum Opinion and Order RE: Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, 
Filed January 23, 2008 ................................................................................................... 502 
Notice of Appeal, Filed March 5, 2008 ............................................................................... 549 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending the Appeal, 
Filed May 30, 2008 ....................................................................................................... 570 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New for New Trial, Filed November 19, 2007 ........................................ ,.453 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, 
Filed December 13, 2007 ................................................................................................ 492 
Special Verdict Form, Filed October 30, 2007 ..................................................................... .443 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 401 
ORJGINAL 
David E. Comstock, ISB #: 2455 
Taylor Mossman, ISB #: 7500 
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise; Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
Byron V. Foster, ISB #: 2760 
Attorney At Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
(·;' 
'' .:,, ,:_ 
Fi U 
u 
-------~-·---.DEPU rv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, ) 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD ) 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
) 
.Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN ) 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., ) 
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I ) 
through X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
--· ____________ .) 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 1 
G:\S<:hmocl1el\Pleadings\M!L\Response Memo to MIL- BVF.doc 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. Comstock 
and Byron V. Foster, and respectfully submit this Memorandum in Response to 
Defen.dants' Motions in Limine. Defendants Byrne, Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
have overlapping arguments in their respective Motions in Limine. For the Court's 
convenience, the Plaintiffs address those issues that overlap together and those that don't 
separately. 
1. Evidence Pertaining to the Williams Case or the Care and Treatment of 
Patients other than Mrs. Schmechel Should not be Excluded. 
The Defendants seek to exclude from the jury's consideration any evidence pertaining 
to a prior case-Le., the Williams case, in which Mr. Byrne prescribed Methadone to a 
patient and the patient died as a result. The Defendants assert that such evidence is not 
relevant to the present matter. The Plaintiffs argue otherwise. As in the instant case 
involving Mrs. Schmechel, Mr. Byrne wrongfully prescribed Methadone to a patient, and 
his negligence resulted in the patient's death. Evidence pertaining to the Wifliams case 
and Mr. Byrne's previous experience with Methadone will prove that Mr. Byrne was aware 
of the .adverse effects of Methadone before treating Mrs. Schmechel. In other words, 
evidence relating to the Williams case would have the tendency to demonstrate to the jury 
that Mr. Byrne should have foreseen the consequences of prescribing Methadone to Mrs. 
Schmechel, based on his past experience in prescribing it and realizing its fatal effects. 
Defendant Byrne contends that even if the Court does find that evidence 
pertaining to the Williams case is relevant, the probative value of such evidence is 
outweighed by its prejudicial value. Again, the Plaintiffs disagree. The purpose of 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 2 
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introducing evidence relating to patient Williams would not be to invoke passion in the jury, 
nor would it likely have such an effect. Rather, evidence showing that Mr. Byrne 
prescribed Methadone to patient Williams, and Williams subsequently died is a fact that 
proves Mr. Byrne knew of the adverse effects of Methadone, yet continued to wrongfully 
prescri.be it to his patients. The probative value of the fact that Mr. Byrne knew of 
Metha.done's potentially fatal effects before treating Mrs. Schmechel certainly outweighs 
the minor potential that a jury would be overly impassioned by such a fact. 
The Defendants also assert that in introducing evidence of the Williams case the 
Plaintiffs would cause confusion of the issues and lengthen the trial. Plaintiffs assert that 
any confusion on the issue would not come from the Plaintiffs, but from the Defendants. 
The fact is that Mr. Byrne prescribed Methadone to a patient in the past, and that patient 
died. Such evidence could be presented to the jury in a matter of minutes. Any rebuttal 
evidence on the issue would be solely related to whether it actually happened or not. The 
facts that the patient died and that Mr. Byrne was the caregiver that prescribed the 
. Methadone is not in dispute, and therefore, the rebuttal evidence would be limited 
accordingly. The Plaintiffs do not intend to prove that Mr. Byrne breached the standard of 
care in the Williams case. Rather, the Plaintiffs only intend to show that Mr. Byrne has 
prior experience with Methadone and knows of its potentially fatal effects. 
As argued in Defendant Byrne's Memorandum, evidence of the Williams case 
does not prove breach and causation in this case, but it does prove that Mr. Byrne could 
have foreseen Methadone's adverse effects on Mrs. Schmechel. Given that forseeability 
is an element of the Plaintiffs' case, the Plaintiffs submit that evidence of the Williams case 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 3 
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is enti1·ely relevant, and its probative value substantially outweighs any potential for 
prejudice. 
In addition, should the Court determine that Plaintiffs are not entitled to mention 
Wil/iaifls, Plaintiffs should not be prevented from cross examining Defendants based upon 
their prior sworn testimony taken in the Williams case. Rule 804(b)(1) allows a party, over 
a hearsay objection, to present prior sworn testimony. 
2. Statements Made by Mrs. Schmechel do not Constitute Hearsay. 
The Defendants argue that statements Mrs. Schmechel made to Mr. Byrne on 
September 28 and September 29, 2003, should be excluded from evidence because they 
are hearsay. As revealed in deposition testimony from Plaintiffs Robert Lewis, Tamara 
Hall and Vaughn Schmechel, Mrs. Schmechel told Mr. Byrne on the phone that she was 
experiencing several symptoms that were or may have been related to a reaction she was 
having to the medications that Mr. Byrne prescribed her. 
The principle of the Rule on hearsay is to exclude out of court statements that are 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the Plaintiffs intend to introduce 
the evidence to demonstrate two things. First, that the phone calls took place, and 
second, to reveal that Mr. Byrne was aware of Mrs. Schmechel's symptoms preceding her 
death, yet did nothing to relieve the symptoms or prevent her death. The Idaho Court of 
Appeais has held that if an out-of-court statement is relevant for reasons other than what 
the declarant was intending to communicate, the statement is not hearsay for that purpose. 
State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,657 862 P.2d 343,349 (Ct.App. 1993), IRE 801(c). In 
proving that the phone calls took place, the Plaintiffs are not attempting to prove the truth 
of what was said during the conversations, but simply that the conversations took place. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 4 
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Therefore, at the very least, evidence demonstrating that the calls simply took place is 
admissible. 
In addition, Plaintiffs intend to demonstrate not only that the calls took place, but 
that Mrs. Schmechel made Mr. Byrne aware of the specific symptoms she was 
experiencing preceding her death. IRE 803(4) allows use of hearsay statements made "for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertine'nt to diagnosis or treatment." "The rule is premised on the assumption that such 
statements are generally trustworthy because the declarant is motivated by a desire to 
receive proper medical treatment and will therefore be truthful in giving pertinent 
information to the physician." State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 216 953 P.2d 650, 656 
(Ct.App. 1998) (Citing, State v. Kay, 129 ldaho 507, 518, 927 P.2d 897,908 
(Ct.App.1996). The motive to speak the truth to a physician in order to advance a self-
interest in obtaining proper medical care for the declarant or another is generally assumed. 
State v. Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. 
The Court in State v. Kay recognized that the proponent of introducing the out of 
court statements must show: (1) that the statements were "made for purposes of medical 
diagn~sis or treatment"; (2) that the statements described "medical history, or past or 
preselit symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof"; and (3) that the statements 
were ''reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Id. The record in this case, and 
testimony presented at trial will certainly reflect that Mrs. Schmechel's statements were 
made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. Indeed, the unfortunate fact that Mrs. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 5 
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Schmechel died within days of her phone conversations with Mr. Byrne indicates that Mrs. 
Schmechel was experiencing symptoms that she wanted her physician to be aware of. 
The basic justification for the state of mind exception in Rule 803(3) and the 
medical diagnosis exception found in Rule 803(4) is the reliability of the hearsay statement 
when made under circumstances in which it is free of suspicion. Further, the exceptions 
recognize that there is a special need for the evidence because of the difficulty of proving a 
person's state of mind or physical disposition at the time the statements were made. See, 
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 93 Idaho 419 462 P.2d 512 (1969). While there are no cases in Idaho 
addressing whether someone other than the care-giver can testify as to the out-of-court 
statements made for purposes of a medical diagnosis, the plain language of Rule 803(4) 
does not preclude it. The rule simply states that "statements made for purposes of a 
medical diagnosis" are admissible hearsay statements. The rule does not require the 
caregiver to testify as to what the statements were, it just requires that the statements be 
made for purposes of a medical diagnosis. 
In addition, other neighboring courts have held that "statements made for a 
medical diagnosis" are admissible, regardless of who is testifying. State ex rel. Juvenile 
Dept. of Multnomah County v. Pfaff, 164 Oregon 470, 994 P.2d 147 (Or. App. 1999). The 
Oregon Court of Appeals went as far as to hold that statements need not be made to a 
physician. Id. Rather, "[s]tatements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers or even 
members of the family or friends may be within the scope of the exception." Id. Citing, 
Legislative Commentary to Rule 803(4), reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence at 522. 
See also, State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Cornett, 121 Or.App. 264,270,855 P.2d 171 (1993), 
rev. dismissed 318 Or. 323, 865 P.2d 1295 (1994) (rejecting argument that "OEC 803(4) 
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does not apply, because the person hearing the statements did not have a medical 
degree.") Accordingly, the issue is not whether the care-giver who heard the statements 
posse\>ses certain credentials but rather whether the statements meet the requirements of 
Rule 803(4). Therefore, under this framework, Plaintiffs are entitled to introduce 
statements Mrs. Schmechel's made to Mr. Byrne in the days preceding her death. 
Plaintiffs concede that certain family members only heard Mrs. Schmechel's side 
of the conversation. Contrary to what the Defendants argue, this fact, when applied to 
Rule 602, does not necessarily preclude the Plaintiffs from testifying as to the 
conversation. The Defendants argue that the conversations are inadmissible pursuant to 
Rule 602 because the Plaintiffs lack personal knowledge to identify Mr. Byrne as the caller. 
Plaintiffs submit that Rule 602 is not as restricting as the Defendants represent. The Rule 
provides: 
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient 
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the 
testimony of the witness ... " 
Accordingly, the Rule simply requires that the witness have personal knowledge 
of the matter, and such personal knowledge can be shown via the witness's own 
testimony. The family was certainly aware of Mrs. Schmechel's physical condition and that 
she was being treated for pain medication. The family knew that Mrs. Schmechel was 
being treated by Mr. Byrne. The family was aware that Mrs. Schmechel was experiencing 
symptoms related to her medication. Finally, the family was aware that Mrs. Schmechel 
felt a ~eed to relate those symptoms to her caregiver, Mr. Byrne. Moreover, Plaintiffs will 
show that Mr. Lewis had a custom of checking the caller ID at the home to discern who a 
caller is upon receiving the phone call. Such intimate knowledge of their mother's life and 
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medical status demonstrates that the family had the requisite personal knowledge to testify 
on the matter. Notwithstanding such personal knowledge, the alleged incompetence of a 
witness to testify at trial does not necessarily render out-of-court statements by the witness 
incompetent, if they are otherwise admissible hearsay. State v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 
775 P.2d 1224 (1989). 
The Plaintiffs also contend that Mrs. Schmechel's conversation with Mr. Byrne is 
admissible under IRE 803(24). To be admissible under I.R.E. 803(24), the Court must 
determine that ( 1) the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
equivalent to those in Rules 803(1) to 803(23), (2) the statement is offered as evidence of 
a material fact, (3) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (4) 
· the general purposes of the rules of evidence, and the interests of justice, will best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 697 
760 P:Zd 27, 36 (1988). The evidence in this case, as reflected in the present record and 
as will be produced at trial, demonstrates that there are circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness surrounding the phone conversations Mrs. Schmechel had with Mr. Byrne. 
With no motivation to fabricate the information she related to Mr. Byrne and the testimony 
of her family that Mrs. Schrnechel in fact had the conversation and made the statements 
she did to Mr. Byrne, the purposes of the rules of evidence and interests of justice favor 
the admissibility of such evidence. 
3. Dr. Vorse's Testimony should not be limited to her Care and Treatment of 
Mrs. Schmechel. 
The Defendants argue that Dr. Vorse should be prevented from offering any 
testimony regarding her standard of care opinions. The Plaintiffs do not intend to try to 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 8 
G:\Schmeche!\Pleadlngs\Mll\Responso Memo to MIL- BVF,doc 
218 
introdu_ce any opinion Dr. Vorse has on the standard of care in this matter. However, the 
Plaintiffs do intend to offer the testimony of Dr. Lipman, who had a conversation with Dr. 
Vorse in July of 2005, in which the standard of care was discussed. The conversation 
provides one of the foundations for Dr. Lipman's knowledge of the local community 
standard of care. Such a conversation does not constitute hearsay, as the Defendants 
contend, because the information related was made for the purpose of familiarizing Dr. 
Lipman with the local standard of care. Furthermore, Idaho Code§ 6-1012, 6-1013 and 
the Court of Appeals in Keyser v. Garner hold that there is no requirement that the 
information an expert gains to qualify the expert on the local standard of care is somehow 
inadmissible. 129 Idaho 112, 116-117 922 P.2d 409 413-314 (Ct. App. 1996). The 
Plaintiffs must be able to establish a foundation that Dr. Lipman is qualified to testify as an 
expert, and in laying such a foundation, the Plaintiffs will demonstrate that one of the ways 
he gained such qualifications was via his conversation with Dr. Vorse. The Plaintiffs will 
question Dr. Vorse in accordance with what is reflected in her deposition testimony and 
medical records she documented while treating Mrs. Schmechel. 
4. Evidence Regarding Lost Income for Mrs. Schmechel is not Speculative 
and Should be Admissible. 
The Defendants argue that any evidence pertaining to Mrs. Schmechel's loss of 
income is speculative and should not be admissible because Mrs. Schmechel was not 
actually earning a wage, per se, for her work. However, Defendants fail to take into 
consideration the value attributable to Mrs. Schmechel's work when another independent 
contractor either must fill in for the work that she used to perform for the company or Mr. 
Schmechel must do it himself. As is often the case with family run businesses, family 
members supply the labor to keep costs down for the betterment of the company. 
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Additionally, the Defendants misapply Moeller v. Harshbarger. That case stands 
for the rule that when precise amounts of lost income cannot be determined, evidence that 
would speculate as to what that amount might be is inadmissible. 118 Idaho 92, 93 794 
P .2d 1148 (Ct. App. 1990). The trial court in Moeller held that while the plaintiff did lose 
some wages because of the accident in which the plaintiff was involved , because the 
plaintiff did not have a past work record that would enable the court to find, with 
reasonable certainty, that he lost any particular amount, the court could not award lost 
wages based on speculation. The Court of Appeals determined that damages for lost 
earnings must be shown with reasonable certainty; compensatory awards based upon 
speculation and conjecture will not be allowed. Id. Citing, Patino v. Greg and Anderson 
Farms, 97 Idaho 251, 542 P.2d 1170 (1975). In this case, the value of Mrs. Schmechel's 
work is ascertainable and Plaintiffs' expert economist will so testify. That monetary loss is 
not based on speculation or conjecture, it is a determinable fact. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Idaho Courts allow for plaintiffs to recover the 
value of future lost household services. Sheets v. Agro-West, Inc. 104 Idaho 880, 664 P.2d 
787 (1983). In Sheets, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's award of $50,000 in 
household services to plaintiffs in a personal injury action. Thus, in so far as the family unit 
is concerned, there is a monetary return from the services of a housewife which results in 
a savi1ig of the family income that could have otherwise been .used to hire a maid or 
caregiver. The current record, and evidence to be presented at trial reflect that Mrs. 
Schmechel performed household duties and activities. Idaho Courts recognize a value for 
such duties and activities, and evidence pertaining to their value is admissible. Sanchez v. 
Galey, 112 Idaho 609,733 P.2d 1234 (1986). Additionally, there is no set standard for 
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measuring the value of human health or happiness. Swanson v. U.S. By and Through 
Veterans Administration, 557 F.Supp. 1041 (D.C.ldaho 1983). 
With respect to Mrs. Schmechel's Social Security Disability income, the 
Defendants assert that because Mrs. Schmechel was receiving that income because she 
was prevented from working due to her disability, she was not employed and not receiving 
an income. The Defendants are correct. Mrs. Schmechel was receiving a Social Security 
Disability Income because she injured her back, and the injury prevented her from working 
in her previous job, and in any "gainful employment recognized in the national economy." 
Given Mrs. Schmechel's disability, it would have been very difficult for her to obtain any 
sort of "gainful employment." Therefore, she helped as much as possible with the family 
business in order to save on the business's costs. While Mrs. Schmechel's ability to do 
only limited tasks at the family business would not be appreciated in the "national 
economy" the work that she did perform for the business does maintain an economic value 
and should be recognized. 
In addition, it would be senseless to retroactively try to make a determination on 
whether Mrs. Schmechel should have been receiving the benefits or not. The point is that 
there is an ascertainable value to what Mrs. Schmechel did for the family business. The 
activities which Mrs. Schmechel performed are activities in which a business would 
normally have to pay an employee to do. Furthermore, Idaho law recognizes a value for 
household services, and the Plaintiffs should not be precluded from presenting evidence 
related to such value. 
While the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should also be precluded from 
introducing evidence relating to Mrs. Schmechel's contributions to the family business, 
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pursuant to the collateral source rule in Idaho Code § 6-1606, the other family members 
who provided services to the family business cannot be considered a "collateral source" of 
"amounts received" because Mrs. Schmechel performed her own tasks for the business. 
Such tasks were entirely separate than those done by her children, and thus, constitute a 
separate form of income for the business and the Schmechel family. 
5. Plaintiffs do not Intend to Introduce Autopsy Photographs at Trial 
Plaintiffs agree with the Defendants that the probative value of Mrs. Schmechel's 
autopsy photographs or photographs taken after her death is out-weighed by their 
substantial likelihood to inflame or invoke the passions of the jury. Accordingly, the 
Plaintiffs will not seek their introduction at trial. 
6. Evidence Pertaining to a Lack of Informed Consent 
The Defendants' argue that the Plaintiffs should be precluded from introducing 
evidence that Mr. Byrne did not obtain, or did not properly obtain Mrs. Schmechel's 
informed consent when he treated her because the Plaintiffs did not so plead in their 
Complaint. However, a Motion in Limine is not the appropriate vehicle to attack the 
pleadings. If the Defendants wanted to assert such a defense, they should have done so 
in a motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, in so far as the Defendants' Motion in 
Limine seeks clarification on the issue of lack of informed consent, the Plaintiffs are not 
pursuiilg a cause of action for lack of informed consent. However this should not preclude 
Plaintiffs from pursuing testimony regarding the sufficiency of the instructions given to Mrs. 
Schmechel by Defendant Byrne concerning the dosages, frequency and amounts of 
Methadone and Hyrdocodone prescribed by Byrne on September 26, 2003. Such 
evidence constitutes aspects pertaining to Defendant Byrne's violations of the applicable 
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standard of care. In addition, in light of Defendant Dille's denial of a physician/patient 
relationship with Mrs. Schmechel, Plaintiffs should be entitled to assume that Mrs. 
Schmechel had the right to an explanation, from a medical doctor, of her treatment plan 
and how that plan was to be implemented and pursued as well as the risks and benefits of 
such a plan. 
7. Deposition Testimony During Opening Statements 
The Plaintiffs do not intend to use excerpts from depositions in their opening 
statements. However, the Plaintiffs will, as they are entitled to, comment on evidence in 
this case and provide the jury with the basic framework of the Plaintiffs' case. Such 
comments may include references to depositions. The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
while counsel should be allowed latitude in making an opening statement, generally, 
opening remarks should be confined to a brief summary of evidence counsel expects to 
introduce on behalf of his clients case in chief. State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 
(1975). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs are entitled to comment on the evidence, including 
depositions that they intend to present at trial. 
8. Non-disclosed Physicians 
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should be precluded from introducing 
testimony from experts who were used to qualify the testifying experts on the local 
standard of care. However, the Plaintiffs only intend to introduce such testimony to show 
that th'e testifying experts have been adequately familiarized with the local standard of 
care. The Plaintiffs do not seek to introduce the testimony of those who qualified the 
testifying experts to prove that the standard of care was breached. Rather, the Plaintiffs 
simply intend to show that that the testifying experts know what the standard of care is. 
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Furthermore, the Defendants should not be able to have it both ways. If the 
Defenr.Jants do not want the qualifying experts to testify, then any of the qualifying experts 
who believed that Mr. Byrne and/or Dr. Dille did not breach the standard of care should 
also not be able to testify. 
As explained above, Plaintiffs are entitled to lay the proper foundation to qualify 
their experts. In so doing, the Plaintiffs will present testimony from their disclosed experts 
that said experts became familiar with the local standard of care through conversations 
with Idaho care-givers. Thus, Plaintiffs will limit evidence or testimony from non-disclosed 
experts according to the requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1012, 6-1013 and Keyser v. 
Gamer, 129 Idaho 112, 922 P.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1996). 
9. Testimony Relating Criticisms or Concerns Regarding Care and 
Treatment that do not Constitute Breaches of the Standard of Care is 
Relevant. 
The Defendants argue that testimony pertaining to criticisms of Mrs. Schmechel's 
caregivers that do constitute breaches of the standard of care ("Criticisms") should not be 
admissible because they are irrelevant. Such Criticisms are, however, relevant to the 
Plaintiffs' case. In medical malpractice actions, it is often the case that some caregivers 
will have differing opinions as to what the standard of care for a particular patient or case 
is. One caregiver testifies that the standard of care was breached, while another caregiver 
with similar expertise will testify that nothing was done wrong. Accordingly, the line that 
divides whether a breach of the standard of care has occurred is quite often blurred. In 
that respect, testimony that reflects criticisms of a caregiver becomes entirely relevant as it 
contributes to the Plaintiffs theory that even if one particular caregiver did not believe the 
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standard of care was breached, said caregiver does believe that the blurry line was 
approached. 
Having determined that the Criticisms are relevant, the Plaintiffs also contend that 
such Criticisms would not unfairly prejudice the Defendants or mislead the jury. Plaintiffs 
are entitled to present their case to the jury, and by presenting testimony of caregivers that 
are critical of Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dilles' care, the jury would be equipped to consider all the 
evidence relating to the care Mrs. Schmechel received, and draw their own conclusions as 
to whether the Criticisms contribute to whether or not the standard of care was breached. 
10. Criminal History of the Plaintiffs Should be Excluded. 
The Defendants argue that the criminal history of the Plaintiffs should be 
admissible. As addressed in the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and Memorandum in Support, 
the Plaintiffs assert that such evidence is not relevant. With respect to the Defendants' 
argument that two of Plaintiffs' past criminal histories bear on their credibility, such an 
assertion might be accurate if they were still using illicit drugs. However, both Mr. Lewis 
and Ms. Howard have completed their sentences, have "paid their debt to society," have 
rehabilitated themselves and are now responsible members of the community. Their lives 
have changed for the better and to now take the position that their credibility is suspect in 
light of their past actions would serve to perpetuate a stereotype of the "ex-con" that does 
not apply to these two Plaintiffs. If someone has been in trouble with the law and 
subsequently evidenced rehabilitation from those former habits, there is no longer any 
valid reason to believe their veracity or their credibility is not equal to other members of the 
community. In addition, there is doubt as to whether convictions for drug offenses impact 
an individual's capacity for speaking truthfully and accurately. The use of illicit drugs may 
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certainly change a person's character but to find that once the person is no longer using 
drugs, those character changes continue to exist ignores the benefit of rehabilitation, which 
is the foundation for drug courts and rehabilitation programs world wide. 
The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs' criminal history is relevant because it 
is probative of the nature of the Plaintiffs' relationship with Mrs. Schmechel, and serves as 
a defense to the Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim. However, the criminal histories of both 
Kim Howard and Robert Lewis have absolutely no bearing on the relationship they had 
with their mother. If anything, their mother provided even more love and support for Kim 
and Robert during trying times in their lives. Further, the dates of incarceration were 
minimal, and a significant period of time has passed since either Kim or Robert have been 
charged with even a minor traffic violation, much less a felony. In fact, Robert has been 
the successful owner of an antique shop and a roofing business and has been 
disassociated from drugs and criminal thinking for over seven years. Clearly, the criminal 
records of Kim and Robert are so far attenuated from the relationship they enjoyed with 
their mother that any mention of such criminal history should be excluded. 
l-l~ 
DATED this _J_ day of October, 2007. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
Taylor ossman, of the Firm 
Attorne s for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ ~y of October, 2007, I served a true and correct 
. copy of the above and foregoing iri'stument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
601 W. Bannock St 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Di/Je, M. D. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, PA 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
PO Box 1271 
Boise ID 83701 
Attorneys for Thomas Byrne, PA 
D 
D [6 
D 
B, 
U.S. Mail· 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (208) 388-1300 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
~~ Taylrfvfossman 
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Keely E. Duke 
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Chris D. Comstock 
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Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
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Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byme 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFT.E-:1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
V AOGBN: SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representa,ive of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
. LEWIS,KIMHOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON .DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CV-05-4345 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNJVS 
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF 
EXPERT WI'l'NESSES 
COMES NOW defendant, Thomas J. Byrne, P.A., by and through his counsel ofrecord, 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecbt & Blanton, P.A., and makes the following supplemental disclosures pursuant 
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to Rule 26(b )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure related to experts who may be called to testify 
at trial: 
DISC£OSURES 
Without waiving such objections, and subject to such reservations as asset forth in Mr. 
Byrne's original Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, Mr. Byrne makes the following supplemental 
disclosures: 
1. Chris J. Kottenstette, P A·C 
8405 E. Hampden Ave., Apt. 23-C 
Denver, CO 80231 
(970) 215-0903 
Substmce of Facts: 
In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original Disclosure of 
Expert Witnesses, Mr. Kottenstette has reviewed the following items: 
Depositions: 
a) Dr. Groben; 
b) Shaiyenne Anton; 
c) Dr. Lorden; 
d) Dr. Lipman; 
e) Mr. Keller; 
f) Dr. Verst; 
g) Dr. Vorse; 
h) Dennis Chambers 
i) Dr. Harris; and 
j) Kent Jensen. 
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Medical Records: 
a) Medical records of decedents' care providers. 
Pleadings: 
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures. 
Miscellaneous: 
a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; and 
b) Inventory of medications and pill counts prepared by cotmsel after 
inspection of materials at Coroner's office. 
Mr. Kottenstette has not testified as a retained expert within the previous four years. He did 
provide trial testimony in February, 20D7, as a trea1fag medical provider in a criminal matter set in 
Los Angeles. 
2. Rodde Cox, M.D. 
1000 N. Curtis, Suite 202 
Boise, ldaho 83706 
(209) 377.3435 
Substance of Facts: 
In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original lJisclo$ure of 
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Cox has reviewed the following items: 
Depositions: 
a) Dr. Groben; 
b) Shaiyenne Anton; 
c) Dr. Lordo11; 
d) Dr. Lipman; 
e) Mr. Keller; 
f) Dr. Verst; 
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g) Dr. Vorse; 
h) Dennis Chambers; 
i) Dr. Hanis; and 
j) Kent Jensen. 
Medical Records: 
a) Medical records of decedents' care providers. 
Pleadings: 
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures. 
Miscellaneous: 
a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; ,md 
b) Inventory of medications and pill ceunts prepared by counsel after 
inspection of materials at Coroner's office. 
3. Keri L. Fakata, Pharm.D 
3838 S. 700 E., Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Substance of Facts: 
In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original Disclosure of 
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Fakata has reviewed the following items: 
Depositions: 
a) Dr. Groben; 
b) Shaiyenne Anton; 
c) Dr. Lordon; 
d) Dr. Lipman; 
e) Mr. Keller; 
f) Dr. Verst; 
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g) Dr. Vorse; 
h) Dennis Chambers; 
i) Dr. Hams; and 
j) K,mt Jensen. 
Medical Records: 
a) Medical recoxds of decedents' care providers. 
Pleadings: 
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures. 
Miscellaneous: 
a) Slides produced by ))r. Lipman; and 
b) Inventory of medications .md pill counts prepared by counsel after 
inspection of materials at Coroner's office. 
4. James Smith, M.D. 
Boise Heart Clinic 
287 W. Jefferson 
Boise, ID 83102 
Suk,ject Matter: 
Applicable and internal medicine, medical principles, causation, and damages, including 
life expectancy. 
Substance of Opinions: 
It is anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify that, on a more probable than not basis, the likely 
cause of Mrs. Schmechel 's death was a cardiac death, likely a fatal dysrhyth.mia. He will testify that 
the dysrhythmia was caused by her underlying cardiac and other co-morbid conditions. 
In addition to relying on all materials previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original :Oisclosure 
of Expert Witnesses related to Dr. Smith, and identified in this supplemental disclosure, Dr. Smith 
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relies on the deposition of Dr. Glen Groben, M.D.; Dr. Groben's autopsy report and toxicology 
report; the deposition testimony of Shaiyenne Anton and Coroner's records and notes, as well as 
those of the Sherriff's office; death scene photographs, and descriptions of the death scene. 
Dr. Smith believes the evidence indicates that MrS. Schmechel suffered a fatal cardiac 
dysrhythmia while awake sitting up on her couch. He believes that she had a number of underlying 
co-morbid conditions which likely contributed to this fatal cardiac death. These would include her 
cardiomegaly, high blood pressure, history of smoking, and smoking at the time of death, her 
documented obesity, and her significant narrowing of the coronary arteries. In addition, Dr. Smith 
will testify that had Mrs. Schmechel not passed away when she did, and if, in fact, her death was 
attributable to medications she was taking, rather than her underlying co-morbid condition, 
epiderniologic research, and specific findings of co-morbid risk factors, suggest Mrs. Schmechel' s 
life expectancy was less than ten years from the time she died. To reach this conclusion, Dr. Smith 
relied upon the autopsy report and findings of co-morbid conditions, as well as the documented 
history of elevated cholesterol and triglycerides, elevated blood pressure, evidence of the 
hypertensive kidney damage, the significant stenosis of the major coronary arteries, and her 
obstructive sleep apnea. Other factors include Mrs. Schrnechel' s history of srooking and failure to 
discontinue smoking despite repeated warnings and suggestions to do so, her obesity, her chronic use 
of narcotics, Bextra, and other medications, as well as other factors identified on autopsy, in 
depositions, and the medical records. 
Dr. Smith also relies upon various epidemiologic studies identifying risk factors and 
likelihood of death, i11ch1ding the Framingham Study and updates, the MRFIT, Multiple Risk Factor 
Intervention Study, and his years of clinical practice as a cardiologist, as well as other literature and 
studies he is familiar with generally. Such information and experience allow him to identify specific 
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risk factors that increased Mrs. Schmechel' s likelihood of an early cardiac death. Her risk was 
grealerthan generalized epidemio!ogic studies that take into account only certain factors, and do not 
identif-y other factors that were not known until her autopsy. 
Dr. Smith also may rely upon the testimony that may be provided at trial by other defense 
experts, defendants, and others, as well as Basalt's Disposition ofToxJc Drugs in Man. 5th Ed. and 
any of the documents identified below: 
Substance of Facts: 
In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original Disclosure of 
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Smith has reviewed the following items: 
Depositions: 
a) Dr. Groben; 
b) Shaiyenne Anton; 
c) Dr. Lordon; 
d) Dr. Lipman; 
e) Mr. Keller; 
f) Dr. Verst; 
g) Dr. Vorse; 
h) Dennis Chambers; 
i) Dr. Harris; and 
j) Kent Jensen. 
Medical Records: 
a) Medical records of decedent$' cate providers. 
Pleadings; 
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a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures. 
Miscellaneous: 
a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; 
b) Inventory of medications and pill counts prepared by counsel after 
inspection of materials at Coroner's office; 
c) Various photographs of the death scene produced; 
d) Complete Coroner's file and Ada County Pathologist's file; and 
e) Complete Twin Falls County file. 
Literature: 
a) Framingham Heart Study and Cardiac Risk Assessment Profiles; and 
b) MRFIT: Multiple Risk Factor !ntervention Study. 
5. Scott Phillips, M.D., F.A.C.P. 
Toxicology Associates 
2555 S ))owning Street, Ste. 260 
Denver, Colorado 80210 
Substance of Facts: 
In additional to the those items previously identified in IYir. Byn1e's original Disclosure of 
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Phillips has reviewed the following items: 
Depositions: 
a) Dr. Oroben; 
b) Shaiyenne Anton; 
C) Dr. Lordon; 
d) Dr. Lipman; 
e) Mr. Keller; 
f) Dr. Verst; 
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g) Dr. Vorse; 
h) Deruris Chall:lbers; 
i) Dr. Harris; and 
j) Kent Jensen. 
Medical Records; 
a) Medical records of decedents' care providers. 
Pleadings: 
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures. 
Miscellaneous: 
a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; and 
b) inventory of medicatiollS and pill counts prepared by counsel after 
inspection of materials at Coroner's office. 
6. In addition, defendants reserve the right for their experts to rely upon any journal 
articles, medical texts, treatises, abstracts, teaching materials or other medical literature of any kind 
or nature referenced or relied upon by plaintiffs' experts, <1-l)y llterature created or edited by plaintiffs' 
experts, and any other medical literature ideJltified or produced by plaintiffs. 
DATED this 5¾ay of October, 2007. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
&BLANTON,P.A. 
By~ /4 Keely E. Duke. Of the Firm D Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 51'-aay of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF 
EXPERT WITNESSES, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaintifft 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
POBox2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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__ U.S. Mall, Postage Prepaid 
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_ ,2-vemight Mail 
_L1elecopy 
t Keely E. Duke 
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Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 --OEi"UI Y 
ISB #2455 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorney At Law 
199 N, Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
Facsimile: (208) 344-772 i 
ISB #: 2760 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal Case No. CV 05-4345 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH SUPPLMENTAL EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES -1 
238 
V\,,t.,-V.J-L,VV/ .1..L,t....l VVl'I.J I vv1, U U'\/..JI I L-VV"V"T"T- I 1'-.1.. 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. Comstock, 
of Comstock & Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and pursuant to the Court's 
Scheduling Order and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26, hereby supplements their list of 
expert witnesses to be called at the trial of this case: 
Plaintiffs' experts Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm.D., Stephen P. Lorden, M.D., and 
Jimmie E. Keller, MPH, PA-C have reviewed the following additional documents, 
depositions and medical records of Rosalie Schmechel: 
1. Article: Sleep-Disordered Breathing in Stable Methadone Program Patients: 
A Pilot Study; 
2. Article: Sleep-Disordered Breathing Associated with Long-Term Opioid 
Therapy; 
3. Article: Control of Breathing During Methadone Addiction; 
4. Article: Methadone Reincarnated: Novel Clinical Applications with Related 
Concerns; 
5. Article: Obstructive Sleep Apnea in the Adult Obese Patient: Implications for 
Airway Management; 
6. Deposition transcripts of Clinton Dille, M.D., Glen Graben, M.D., Kimberly 
Vorse, M.D., and Vaughn Schmechel; 
7. 2003 IDAPA Rules and Regulations for Physician's Assistants; and 
8. Delegation of Services Agreement between Thomas J. Byrne, PA and 
Clinton Dille, M.D.; 
In addition, Dr. Lipman and Mr. Keller have reviewed the deposition transcript of Dr. 
Lordon. Dr. Lipman and Dr. Lordon have also reviewed medical records of Kenneth Harris, 
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M.D., including: 
1. Office notes dated October 8, 1997, May 1, 2001, May 11, 2001, May 30, 
2001, July 12, 2001, May 6, 2002, June 18, 2002, July 2, 2002, July 23, 
2002, August 26, 2002, October 2, 2002, December 16, 2002, July 2, 2003, 
and August 27, 2003; 
2. Physician center/encounter forms dated May 1, 2001, Fylay6, 2002, June 18, 
2002, July 2, 2002, October 2, 2002, December 16, 2002, July 2, 2003, and 
August 27, 2003; 
3. The Medicine Shoppe refill authorization requests for Norvasc and Enalapril 
Maleate dated September 4, 2003; 
4. Handwritten notes dated October 8, 1997, October 16, 2002 and June 12, 
2003; 
5. Phone call note dated June 4, 2002; 
6. Physician Center Well Women Examination-Ages 140-70 years dated 
September 25, 2003; 
7. Magic Valley Regional Medlcal Center Department of Diagnostic Imaging 
Services request dated October 9, 2003; 
8. Cytology report dated September 25, 2003; 
9. Hematology Cell Count/Differential and Coagulation reports, EKG graphic 
report, and chest PA and LAT radiology reports dated December 16, 2002; 
and 
10. Idaho Diagnostic Sleep Lab Short Report and Polysomnpgraphy report dated 
June 12, 2002. 
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Plaintiffs' experts will testify as to their understanding as to the facts of this case 
based upon their review of the above-referenced documents, depositions and medical 
records. 
DATED this _5_ day of October, 2007. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I 
' 
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I hereby certify that on this i; day of October, 2007, l served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated b~low, upon: 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
601 W. Bannock St. 
PO Box2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, PA · 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
PO Box 1271 
Boise ID 83701 
D U.S. Mail 
D.,., Hand Delivery 
[] Facsimile (208) 388-1300 
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D Hand Delivery 
[3..- Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, ) 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal ) Case No. CV-05-4345 
Representative of the Estate of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD ) 
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of ) 
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM 
) 
~- ) 
) 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN ) 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., ) 
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I ) 
~roughX, ) 
) 
Defendants. 
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Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, respectfully submit this 
memorandum in an effort to offer the Court a summary of the background of the case and 
address certain issues likely to come before the Court during trial. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Rosalie Schmechel died six days after changing her pain management from 
Kimberly Vorse, M.D., at the Sun Valley Pain and Sleep Center, to the Defendants who 
dramatically altered her prescription narcotics. Mrs. Schmechel had a complicated 
medical history of chronic low back pain and right leg pain for approximately thirty years. 
Her surgeries included two lumbar fusions and bilateral knee arthroscopies. Dr. Vorse was 
Mrs. Schmechel's treating physician from October 29, 1996, to September 16, 2003. Dr. 
Vorse's diagnosis as of September 16, 2003, was lumbar arachnoiditis, severe obstructive 
sleep apnea, worsening left knee osteoarthritis, acute right knee meniscal injury and 
repair, periodic limb movement disorder, hypertension and nasal obstruction, for which 
surgery was recommended. 
Dr. Vorse prescribed Oxycontin twice daily and one tablet at bedtime, along with 
Lortab, as needed for pain. To relieve her increased pain, Dr. Vorse increased Mrs. 
Schmechel's Oxycontin dosage. Mrs. Schmechel was and had been on CPAP therapy for 
her severe obstructive sleep apnea since July, 2002. Mrs. Schmechel was pleased with 
the care provided by Dr. Vorse; however the distance and winter travel were concerns for 
her, along with work her husband would miss to drive her to her appointments, so she 
decided to try treatment at the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. At the time she discontinued 
treatment with Dr. Vorse, Mrs. Schmechel was complaining of worsening low back pain 
and bilateral knee pain and had undergone evaluation by Dr. David Verst, who felt 
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continued conservative pain management was appropriate. Mrs. Schmechel had been 
under medical care for her pain for a very long time and was a very compliant patient 
during her treatment, following Dr. Vorse's directions very carefully, particularly as they 
pertained to her pain medications. 
Mrs. Schmechel was first seen at Southern Idaho Pain Institute on September 26, 
2003. · The typed office note for that date by Thomas Byrne, P.A., signed by Clinton Dille, 
M.D., indicates an assessment of (1) Post laminectomy/fusion ongoing back pain with 
minimal radicular symptoms, and (2) Pain management. Mr. Byrne's plan was to 
discontinue Oxycontin, start methadone at a dosage of 10 mg every 12 hours, and a 
titrated dose from 5 mg to maximum of 15 mg over 72 hours, depending on its benefit. 
Hydrocodone was increased to 10/500 mg one every four to six hours. The 
corresponding handwritten office note indicates Mrs. Schmechel was to follow up by 
telephone for problems. 
However, the handwritten instructions which Mr. Byrne gave to Mrs. Schmechel 
regarding the titration dose of Methadone indicates something different than his typed 
history and physical of that date. While the history and physical indicates she was to start 
Methadone at a dosage of 10 mg every 12 hours titrated from 5 mg to a maximum of 15 
mg over the next 72 hours, his handwritten instructions indicate she could take one half to 
one pill every 12 hours and could increase the dosage to a maximum of one and one half 
pills every 12 hours or a total of 30 mg of Methadone, with no instruction regarding the 
time period over which this increased dosage could be begun. Therefore, Mrs. Schmechel 
could reasonably have believed she could have increased her dosage of Methadone to a 
total of 30 mg per day without regard to any 72 hour period. 
The next office note indicates a call to Mrs. Schmechel on September 29, 2003 at 
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which time she was advised to increase Methadone to 10 mg at bedtime and 1 O mg at 
daytime, and to follow up sooner if problems. The following office note, dated September 
30, 2003, indicates Mrs. Schmechel called in as instructed, and was taking Methadone at a 
dosage of 10 mg a.m. and 15 mg p.m. She was advised to titrate the dose on a variable 
basis between 10 and 15 mg a.m. and p.m. The note indicates a minimal amount of 
short-acting Hydrocodone for pain control and follow up with Mr. Byrne by phone the 
following week. That is the last chart note regarding any treatment for Mrs. Schmechel. 
Notably, other than a handwritten chart note dated September 26, 2003, there is no 
indication that Dr. Dille or anyone at Southern Idaho Pain Institute paid any notice to Mrs. 
Schmechel's severe obstructive sleep apnea, for which she had been treated with CPAP 
therapy since July, 2002. It appears there was no effort by Dr. Dille or anyone at Southern 
Idaho Pain Institute to familiarize themselves with Mrs. Schmechel's extensive and 
complicated medical history or to obtain prior medical records of other providers before 
making sweeping changes in her pain management regimen. 
There is a dispute between the deposition testimony of Defendant Byrne and 
Plaintiffs Robert Lewis, Vaughn Schmechel and Tamara Hall regarding whether or not Mrs. 
Schmechel spoke to someone from the Southern Idaho Pain Institute on Saturday and 
Sunday, September 27 and 28, 2003. While Mr. Byrne denies such conversations took 
place, Mr. Lewis has testified that he overheard his mother, Mrs. Schmechel, speaking 
with someone from Southern Idaho Pain Institute and indicating that she was suffering 
nausea, upset stomach and lower extremity swelling and pain. There is no chart note 
indicating either telephone call in the records of Southern Idaho Pain Institute. 
On October 2, 2003, Rosalie Schmechel was pronounced dead from acute 
combined poisoning with Methadone and Hydrocodone, according to the Twin Falls 
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County Coroner's office. 
II. 
ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE 
This is a medical malpractice/wrongful death case. Plaintiffs allege the medical 
negligence of Defendants Byrne, Dillie and Southern Idaho Pain Institute all causally 
contributed to the wrongful death of Mrs. Schmechel and to the loss of love and 
consortium of her family members. Plaintiffs accordingly have the burden of proving that 
each of these medical providers violated the applicable standard of care; various statues 
and regulations and are medically negligent and/or negligent per se. 
Ill. 
THE INDETERMINABLE ST AND ARD OF CARE 
Idaho Code§ 6-1012 mandates that a plaintiff in a medical negligence action must 
come forward with expert testimony establishing a violation, by the defendant, of the 
applicable standard of health care practice. The Statute reads, in pertinent part: 
" ... (p)laintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in 
chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a 
preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such 
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in 
which such care was or allegedly should have been provided, 
as such standard existed at the time and place of the alleged 
negligence ... and as such standard then and there existed with 
respect to the class of health care provider that such defendant 
then and there belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it 
was functioning. Such individual providers of health care shall 
be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified 
providers of the same class in the same community, taking into 
account his or her training, experience, and fields of 
specialization, if any. If there be no other like provider in the 
community and the standard of practice is therefore 
indeterminable evidence of such standard in similar Idaho 
communities at said time may be considered. As used in this 
act, the term "community" refers to that geographical area 
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ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest 
to which such care was or allegedly should have been 
provided." (Emphasis added). 
The manner and method for qualifying an out-of-area expert for rendering testimony 
against an Idaho health care provide has been the subject of many Idaho appellate court 
decisions. Perhaps one of the most thorough analyses of the state of Idaho law on this 
subject is contained in Keyser v. Garner, 129 Idaho 112, 922 P.2d 409 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1996). Keyser was a medical negligence case involving a suit by the parents of a severely 
brain damaged infant against a Boise ear, nose and throat physician. After losing at trial, 
plaintiffs appealed and one of the issues on appeal was the foundation for testimony of 
one of the defendants' out of area medical experts and the method by which an out-of-
town expert in a medical malpractice case may gain 'actual knowledge' of the local 
standard of care as required by Idaho Code§ 6-1013. Id. The expert doctor in question, 
Dr. Muntz, was a board certified pediatric ENT practicing at Children's Hospital in St. 
Louis, Missouri and also a faculty member of Washington University Medical School. At 
trial, Dr. Muntz stated that in order to familiarize himself with the Boise standard of practice 
for the medical concerns of the infant, he had spoken with a board certified ENT practicing 
in Boise, reviewed the infant's medical records and reviewed depositions taken in the case 
of other physicians who have practiced in Boise. Keyser, supra, at 116. 
While Dr. Muntz was permitted to testify at trial, in ruling on plaintiffs' motion for new 
trial, the trial court concluded that Dr. Muntz's testimony should have been excluded 
because an inadequate foundation had been laid regarding the standard of care in Boise. 
The trial court held that the testimony of Dr. Muntz was flawed because he based his 
opinion upon hearsay from other local physicians, which the court determined was 
insufficient to constitute the necessary foundation. Keyser v. Garner, supra, at 116-117. 
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The Court of Appeals, in discussing the District Court's decision stated the 
following: 
"This issue of how to meet the foundational standards for out of 
area experts has been addressed a number of times by the 
Idaho Supreme Court since the enactment of Idaho Code § 6-
1013. The first such decision is Buck v. SI. Clair, 1 08 Idaho 
743, 702 P.2d 781 (1985). In that case, the trial court had 
concluded that the plaintiff's out of state expert lacked actual 
knowledge of the Boise standard of care because he had not 
practiced in Boise, had not admitted patients to Boise hospitals, 
had not evaluated any area medical facilities, and was not 
familiar with any local medical literature. The trial court 
therefore granted a directed verdict for the defendant. The 
Supreme Court reversed. The court stated that an out of town 
physician must make an inquiry to ensure that there are no 
local deviations from the national standard. In the Buck case, 
the plaintiffs expert testified that he obtained familiarity with the 
local standard through his specialty training and through 
questioning of a Caldwell physician who informed the expert 
that the local standard was equivalent to the national standard. 
The Idaho Supreme Court found this inquiry sufficient to qualify 
the witness to testify." 
Keyser, supra, at 117. 
The Court in Keyser v. Gamer went on to quote from Frank v. East Shoshone 
Hospital, 114 Idaho 480, 757 P.2d 1199 (1988). In that case, the expert witness testified 
that he had not discussed the standard of care with any local doctors. In affirming the 
grant of summary judgment for defendant, the Court in Frank stated: 
"Our decision today does not cast an onerous burden on 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. It is not an overly 
burdensome requirement to have an expert become familiar 
with the standard of care in the community where alleged 
malpractice is committed. In Buck v. St. Clair, the expert 
became familiar with the local standard of care by simply 
questioning a local doctor." 
Frank, supra at 482. 
In a concurring opinion in the Frank case, Justice Huntley similarly observed that: 
"[l]t does not take a Herculean effort for an expert to become 
familiar with the local standard of care. It can be done on the 
telephone." 
Frank, supra at 484. 
The Court of Appeals in Keyser went into an in depth analysis of several other 
Idaho decisions and then determined that foundation for establishing a familiarity with the 
local standard of care "is satisfied by an out of area physician's testimony that he or she 
has conversed about those standards with a qualified physician practicing in the 
community." Keyser, supra at 117. The Court of appeals further found that even when 
no national standard applies to the case at bar, an out of area expert may satisfy the 
foundational criteria of Idaho Code § 6-1013 "by obtaining information about the local 
standard of practice through consultations with one or more qualified local physicians." 
Keyser, supra at 118-119. 
Thus, case law in Idaho contemplates that an out of area physician can meet the 
foundational requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1012 and § 6-1013 by conducting a 
telephone conversation with a qualified Idaho physician. There is no requirement that the 
qualifying physician submit an affidavit and there is no requirement that the information 
gained through the telephone conversation is somehow inadmissible. This issue is put to 
rest by Keyser. To find otherwise, would be to place a mandatory burden upon Plaintiffs 
that in every medical negligence case they must illicit testimony of a local physician. This 
is not what the statutes contemplate. Keyser v. Gamer, supra, establishes the 
methodology by which a plaintiff in a medical negligence claim can satisfy the actual 
knowledge requirement of Idaho Code § 6-1013. The applicable portion of that code 
section states: 
"This section shall not be constr\led to prohibit or otherwise 
preclude a competent expert witness who resides elsewhere 
from adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and 
practices of (a particular) such area and thereafter giving 
opinion testimony in such a trial." 
Idaho Code§ 6-1013. 
Against this backdrop, what is a plaintiff to do when no local qualifying expert can 
be located who will speak with the plaintiff's out-of-area experts? The answer is found in 
the language quoted above from I.C. § 6-1012 and the two cases that have interpreted that 
portion of the Statute; Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752,828 P.2d 315 (1992) and Morris v. 
Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,937 P.2d 1212 (1997). 
In Hoene, Plaintiffs brought suit against a cardiovascular surgeon in Boise, arising 
out of a PDA surgery. In attempting to qualify their expert, plaintiffs discovered that Dr. 
Barnes and his business associates were the only cardiovascular surgeons in the state 
who performed this type of surgery. Thus, plaintiffs had no health care provider to turn to 
in Idaho through which to qualify their expert. The Idaho Supreme Court, in discussing this 
issue applied the language of§ 6-1012 to find the following: 
Under the unique circumstances of this case, there was no 
provider of PDA surgery by a cardiovascular surgeon in Idaho 
other than Dr. Barnes and his colleagues who practiced as a 
professional association. Because these physicians all 
practiced together and were part of one business entity, we 
treat them as one provider under the statue. Therefore, we 
conclude under Idaho Code § 6-1012 that the standard of 
health care practice in the community ordinarily served by St. 
Luke's was indeterminable. We also conclude that no 'similar 
Idaho communities' existed about which Monica could have 
presented evidence of the standard of practice for a 
cardiovascular surgeon performing PDA surgery. Therefore, 
Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not provide a means of 
establishing the applicable standard of practice in this case." 
121 Idaho 752 at 754. 
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The Supreme Court went on to determine that it needed to turn to Idaho decisions 
which predated the enactment of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 to determine the 
common law of Idaho prior to the enactment of those statutes in order to determine the 
methodology by which plaintiffs, under these circumstances, could qualify their expert 
witness. 
After its review of Idaho common law regarding this issue, the Court in Hoene 
concluded that prior to the enactment of Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 in 1976, the 
common law rule in Idaho was the similar localities rule and that this similar localities rule 
was not limited to similar localities in Idaho. Thus, plaintiffs' expert, who had practiced 
cardiovascular surgery in Syracuse, New York, and had served two terms on the American 
Board of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery, had demonstrated actual knowledge of the 
standard of practice for cardiovascular surgeons throughout the United States, including 
the standards in localities similar to the community ordinarily served by St. Luke's. 
In Morris, plaintiffs sued a physician in Emmett, Idaho. At trial, plaintiffs' expert was 
not allowed to testify because the expert attempted to testify to the standard of care in 
similar Idaho communities as opposed to the specific standard of care in Emmett. 
Plaintiffs' argument was that the only other qualified health care provider in Emmett was 
Defendant's expert and therefore, pursuant to Hoene, plaintiffs could look to similar Idaho 
communities for a health care provider to qualify their expert. However, the court held that 
the plaintiff could not establish the local standard of care under§ 6-1012 by reference to 
similar communities until the plaintiff demonstrates to the court that the standard of care in 
the plaintiff's community is indeterminable due to the absence of other health care 
providers in the community. 130 Idaho 138 at 147. Ultimately, the Court held that the 
plaintiff failed to establish that no other health care provider was practicing in the plaintiff's 
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community through which the plaintiff's expert could have been familiarized with the local 
standard of care. Id. 
The Morris opinion indicates that had plaintiffs established that other health care 
providers in Emmett had refused to speak with their expert, they could have established 
that the standard of care was indeterminable pursuant to § 6-1012. This is exactly the 
situation presented in the instant case. There were no other qualified health care provider 
in Twin Falls, Idaho, to speak with Plaintiffs' experts. Therefore, under this alternative 
argument, the standard of care in Twin Falls, Idaho, is "indeterminable" pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 6-1012. 
Plaintiffs could find no local qualifying expert for either their anesthesiologist/pain 
management expert, Dr. Lordon; their Dr. of Pharmacy, Dr. Lipman; or their physician's 
assistant, Jim Keller. Thus, with the assistance of legal nurse consultant Lorraine Shoaf-
Kadish, Plaintiffs undertook to locate suitable qualifying experts from elsewhere in Idaho. 
Ms. Shoaf-Kadish, after searching areas elsewhere in Idaho, located Craig Flinders, M.D., 
an anesthesiologist/pain management physician practicing in Lewiston, Idaho. Tom 
Rambow, a pain management PA practicing in Boise, Idaho, and David Martin, a PA in 
Pocatello, agreed to speak with Plaintiffs' experts. (See Affidavit of Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish, 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Byron V. Foster (("Foster Aff.")) filed herewith). 
Those two individuals agreed to speak with Plaintiffs' experts regarding the standard of 
health care practice; as evidenced by Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures, attached as 
Exhibit "B" to the Foster Aff. 
While the Expert Disclosures make clear that both Dr. Flinders and PA Rambow 
and Martin are familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, 
Idaho in September of 2003, should the Court find that such is not the case, Plaintiffs' 
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experts are still sufficiently qualified pursuant to the "indeterminable" language of I.C. § 6-
1012 and Idaho case law as embodied by Hoene and Morris, supra. 
Under the circumstances of this case, either Plaintiffs' experts have laid an 
appropriate foundation for their testimony pursuant to their conversations with Dr. Flinders, 
Rambow and Martin; or, because Plaintiffs could find no other qualified health care 
providers in Twin Falls, Idaho willing to speak with their experts, the applicable standard of 
health care practice is "indeterminable" and Plaintiffs can then look to similar Idaho 
communities from which to qualify their experts. In the Hoene case, after determining that 
plaintiffs' cardiovascular surgeon expert could testify based upon his knowledge of similar 
localities outside of Idaho, because of the unique circumstances of that case, the Court 
stated that it was not the legislature's intent to insulate physicians from liability who are in 
the unique position of practicing specialties in which there are a limited number of 
physicians practicing in the local area: "(t)here is no indication in Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 
and 6-1013 that the legislature intended to grant this immunity from suit to those 
physicians who have unique specialties in this state." 121 Idaho 752 at 756. In the 
present case, the Defendants are specialists in pain medication in Twin Falls. There is no 
other entity in Twin Falls devoted specifically to the treatment of pain. Accordingly, it was 
necessary for the Plaintiffs to look elsewhere in order to obtain an unbiased opinion about 
whether the Defendants breached the standard of care . .The Plaintiffs were able to do so, 
and should not be precluded from presented the experts' testimony simply because the 
Defendants have a monopoly on their specialty in Twin Falls. (See, Shoaf-Kadish Aff., 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Foster Affidavit filed herewith). 
The search for expert witnesses in a medical negligence case is a daunting task for 
the plaintiff's bar. The search for local physicians to qualify those experts is often a time 
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consuming, fruitless endeavor. The statutes governing medical malpractice litigation in 
Idaho, as well as the case law on the subject, indicate neither should be used to thwart 
pursuit of a claim against a physician based upon a "conspiracy of silence." So long as a 
plaintiff proceeds in good faith and does everything possible to locate a local qualifying 
health care provider; the failure to find such an individual in the "community" does not, and 
cannot, operate as a bar to the courthouse door. 
Accordingly, as Plaintiffs have done all they could reasonably be required to do to 
qualify their expert witnesses; Plaintiffs believe the Court should find legally sufficient 
foundation for the testimony of their expert witnesses. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS~ day of October, 2007. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. Comstock 
and Byron V. Foster, and respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion in Limine. Defendant Byrne and Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain 
Institute responded to the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine separately. For the Court's 
convenience, this single Memorandum serves as Plaintiffs' Reply to all of the Defendants' 
Responses. 
1. The Criminal History of the Plaintiffs and Other Witnesses is Inadmissible. 
The Defendants assert that the criminal history of Plaintiffs Robert Lewis and Kim 
Howard, as well as that of Mr. Lewis's girlfriend, Amber Zaccone is relevant to impeach 
their credibility at trial. As addressed in their original Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs assert 
otherwise because such criminal history is 1) not relevant to their credibility and 2) the 
probative value of introducing their criminal histories is outweighed by the prejudicial effect. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a); State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628,977 P.2d 890 (1999). 
Because the Court has already been briefed on the Ybarra decision in both the 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum and the Defendants' Response, Plaintiffs will not rehash the law. 
Rather, Plaintiffs simply point out that the Defendants have failed to demonstrate to the 
Court how the Plaintiffs' and Amber Zaccone's criminal histories affect their ability to be 
credible witnesses while testifying in a wrongful death trial. Drug-related crimes are not 
connected to a witness's ability to be truthful on the stand. Even if there were a 
connection, the criminal histories would be irrelevant because Mr. Lewis, Ms. Howard and 
Ms. Zaccone have all rehabilitated themselves and no longer use drugs. In fact, all three 
were given the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves on the Retained-Jurisdiction 
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Program. As the Court is aware, that program instills attributes such as truthfulness, 
veracity, responsibility and accountability in its participants. Although Mr. Lewis violated 
his probation after completing the Rider program, Mr. Lewis has made remarkable 
changes in his life. He owns two businesses and has been sober for a significant period of 
time. The Rules of Evidence and the holding in Ybarra do not contemplate using the 
criminal histories that Mr. Lewis, Ms. Howard and Ms. Zaccone have against them in a civil 
trial. More notably, even if the Court were to determine that their prior convictions are 
relevant, the potential for the jury to be prejudiced by such information far exceeds any 
probative value that the convictions have in this case. 
The Defendants also contend that the criminal histories of Mr. Lewis and Ms. 
Howard somehow disturb their loss of consortium claims because they did not enjoy the 
love and affection of their mother while they were incarcerated. This argument is flawed. 
Mr. Lewis maintained consistent contact on the phone with his mother while on the Rider 
program at Cottonwood and while in the Penitentiary. Mrs. Schmechel sent letters and 
even traveled to Boise to visit him. Mr. Lewis spoke with his mother often while at the 
Penitentiary. Ms. Howard also maintained regular contact with her mother while at the 
Women's Correctional Facility in Pocatello. The spoke on the phone at least twice a week 
and sent cards and letters back and forth. Clearly, Mrs. Schmechel's role as a mother did 
not vanish simply because her children were incarcerated. In fact, the love and support 
Mrs. Schmechel gave them during such difficult times provided motivation for them to 
rehabilitate themselves once they returned to the community. 
4. Dr. Groben's Conclusions about Methadone Toxicity in Mrs. Schmechel 
Should be Excluded. 
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs should not be able to exclude Dr. 
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Groben's testimony concerning the toxicity levels of Methadone in Mrs. Schmechel's 
bloodstream when she died and yet admit Dr. Groben's conclusions regarding the cause of 
death. This argument is also flawed. Dr. Groben's conclusion as to Mrs. Schmechel's 
cause of death is "Acute combined poisoning with Methadone and Hydracodone." This 
conclusion is distinct from a conclusion regarding the level of toxicity of Methadone in the 
blood stream and the resulting conclusion that Mrs. Schmechel was not taking the 
prescribed dose of Methadone. The former conclusion reflects that Mrs. Schmechel was 
poisoned by a combination of two drugs and is a general conclusion about the cause of 
Mrs. Schmechel's death, while the latter would be testimony directly related to toxicity 
levels, which Dr. Graben conceded he is not qualified to comment on. 
Furthermore, the Defendants do not articulate in their response how Dr. Graben is 
qualified to testify about the toxicity levels of Methadone in Mrs. Schmechel or how he 
would be qualified to conclude that Mrs. Schmechel was not taking the prescribed dosage 
of Methadone in the days preceding her death. Again, the Plaintiffs will not rehash the 
elements of Rule 702 and case law on the issue. The fact is that Dr. Graben specifically 
stated that he is not qualified to testify as to levels of toxicity in the bloodstream and he lets 
the toxicologists make those determinations. 
Further, introduction of Dr. Groben's conclusion that Mrs. Schmechel was allegedly 
overdosing on Methadone before she died would be incredibly prejudicial to the Plaintiffs' 
case. Any evidence that Mrs. Schmechel was abusing pain medication belies the Plaintiffs 
case significantly. The jury would perhaps be inclined to assign some blame to Mrs. 
Schmechel for abusing Methadone, when the evidence reflects that she ingested the 
Methadone as prescribed, just as she had always done when prescribed pain medication. 
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Again, even if an objection is made, the harm or prejudice caused by such questions or 
remarks cannot be cured by cautionary instruction. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully 
request that the Court issue an Order in Limine precluding any reference to conclusions 
reached by Dr. Groben about whether or not Mrs. Schmechel ingested the Methadone as 
prescribed. 
5. Cumulative Expert Testimony is Inadmissible. 
· Pursuant to Rule 403, IRE, Defendants should be precluded from presenting 
cumulative expert opinion testimony. While the Defendants contend that it may be 
premature for the Court to exclude expert testimony before it has had an opportunity to 
hear the substance of the Defendants' experts' testimony, the Plaintiffs submit that the 
purpose of Motions in Limine, is in part, for the Court to be able to rule on potentially 
inadmissible evidence before the trial begins, so the jury, Court, and parties involved can 
make more efficient use of trial time. Thus, it is proper for this Court, in its discretion, to 
limit the number and testimony of Defendants' expert witnesses before the trial begins. 
DATED this _Lday of October, 2007. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
4Mossman, oft 
Atto neys for Plaintiff 
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Case No, CV 05 4345 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.O. 
AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN 
INSTITUTE'$ REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Clinton DIiie end the Southern Idaho Pain Institute ("Defendants") moved 
in I/mine to preclude Plaintiffs from attempting to submit Inadmissible testimony and 
evidence on a number of issues, as well as affirmatively seeking the Court's ruling that 
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Plaintiffs' criminal records are admissible. In Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, 
Plaintiffs conceded several issues and contested others. 
The Court should grant Defendants their requested relief on !he uncontested issues 
and should also grant Defendants' contested Motions In Limlne because Plaintiffs have not 
shown the questioned testimony and evidence Is admissible or that they will suffer any 
undue prejudice If the evidence or testimony Is not admitted or Is limited at trial. Finally, the 
Defendants have established that under the circumstances of this case where witness 
credibility is paramount, and the Plaintiffs' have a self Interest ill their testimony, that their 
criminal records are admissible under Rule 609 or are at least admissible to show 
Impairment of the i'>lalntlffs' relationship with Mrs, Schmechel, 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Should Grant The Uncontested Motions in Limine, 
Plalnfiffs did not conte$t a number of Issues raised In Defendants' Motions in Limine. 
Because Plaintiffs agreed with the Defendants on these issues, the Court should grant the 
Defendants their requested relief and: (1) order that no autopsy photos can be admitted at 
trial; (2) find that Plaintiffs are not pursuing a lack of Informed consent claim and preclude 
Plaintiffs from submitting evidence or attempting to argue to the Jury evidence of such claim; 
(3) order that Plaintiffs cannot display transcripts or video clips in their opening statement 
from the depositions taken In this case; and (4) order that Plaintiffs cannot elicit testimony 
from their experts of conversations those experts had with any Idaho practitioner wherein an 
Idaho practitioner allegedly agreed the Defendants' conduct did not meet the applicable 
standard of care. 
Because the Plaintiffs failed to respond to It, the Court should also grant Defendants' 
Motion seeking to preclude Plaintiffs from commenting to the jury on witnesses or expert 
opinions that Defendants disclosed, but did not call or have their experts opine upon at trial. 
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S.L. v. J.H., 883 P.2d 984, 986 (Alaska 1994) ("When a party files a motion and the 
opposing party fails to respond, the superior court may construe the failure to respond as a 
nonopposltlon, and may grant the motion If the relief requested appears to be justified,"); 
See also 56 Am Jur 2d Motions § 29 (2007) {"When a party files a motion and the opposing 
party fails to respond, the court may construe such failure to respond as nonopposltlon to 
the motion or an admission that the motion was meritorious, may take the facts alleged In 
the motion as true, and may grant the motion if the relief requested appears to be justified.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
B. The Court Should Grant the Defendants Contested Motions In Llmine, 
1. Defendants' care and treatment of other gatients js not relevant and anv 
reference to the Defendants' treatment of other patients is more prejudicial than probative. 
In response to Defendants' Motion to exclude any refarence to their care and 
treatment of other patients, Plaintiffs argue evidence of the facts and circumstances of the 
Williams v. Dille case are relevant to show Mr, Byrne's knowledge of the potentially lethal 
effects of Methadone if It Is taken In too large of a dose. There are many less prejudicial 
ways for Plaintiffs to establish Mr. Byrne's knowledge of Methadone's dangers. It Is not 
necessary to refer to the WIiiiams v, Dille matter for the Plaintiffs to establish Mr. Byrne's 
knowledge concerning Methadone's risks. Oefer,d;mts do not dispute that Methadone can 
cause death If taken in excess quantities. Indeed the decedent In the Williams case 
consumed between 40 and 70 tablets In less than 48 hours. Evidence of or reference to 
that case Is simply more prejudicial than probative. 
More over, as disclosed by in the record in this matter, Mr. Byrne was well aware of 
Methadone's (and other opioids') dangers. Mr. Byrne testified at his deposition he was 
aware of the risks of all long acting opioids before he prescribed Methadone to Mrs. 
Schmechel, He further testified at his deposition he discussed with Mrs. Schmechel the 
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risks and benefits of Methadone. Therefore, Mr, Byrne's prior testimony is sufficient for the 
Plaintiffs to establish his knowledge of Methadone's dangers, 
For purposes of this Motion, Defendants are willing to concede Mr. Byrne was aware 
of the dangers, Including death, associated with Methadone. The possible prejudice of 
disclosing the WIiiiams case to the Jury Is obvious as the Jurors may Improperly conclude 
that because Mr. Byrne and the other Defendants were sued because of another 
Methadone death or that they had another patient die from Methadone, they somehow 
automatically bear liability here. The jury could also Improperly seek to punish the 
Defendants for the facts of another case or conclude that because the Defendants were 
sued in another case that they were negligent In this case. Such potential prejudice greatly 
outweighs the Plaintiffs' need to refer to any facts from that case in this matter and any 
reference to the Williams v, DIiie case should be excluded under Rule 403, Moreover, If 
such evidence was allowed it would result in a trial within a trial. 
Plaintiffs also argue they should be allowed to submit deposition testimony from the 
WIiiiams v. DIiie case under Rule of Evidence 801(b)(1). Rule 801(b)(1) only provides an 
exception to the hearsay rule for prior testimony, It does not address the possible prejudice 
that may result from admission of such testimony. Therefore, before admitting any 
deposition testimony from the WIiiiams v. DIiie case, the Court must stlll engage in Rule 403 
balancing and, as discussed above and in the Defendants' Memorandum In Support, such 
testimony Is more prejudicial than probative and Is likely to confuse the Jury. Therefore, any 
reference to the Williams v, Dille case, including deposition testimony given In that case, 
should be excluded, Certainly before any reference Is made to such testimony the matter 
should be taken up outside the presence of the jury, Even if the Court allows Plaintiffs to 
examine the Defendants on deposition testimony from the WIiiiams case, the Court must 
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make sure the facts and circumstances of the Williams case are not disclosed to the Jury 
and that such testimony does not relate to the facts of the other lawsuit. 
2. Evidence of Mrs. Schmechej's alleged phone conversations with Mr, Byrne 
should be excluded because Plaintiffs cannot establish proper evidentiary foundation for 
admission of testimony concerning the alleged conversations. 
Plaintiffs argue evidence of Mrs. Schmechel's alleged phone calls with Mr. Byrne Is 
admissible under Rule 801 (c) because they are not trying to prove the truth of the matters 
asserted In the phone calls. Examination of the purpose for which the Plaintiffs intend to 
offer the phone calls, however, shows they are indeed trying to offer the calls for the truth of 
the matter asserted, /.e., they Intend to offer the phone calls to show that Mrs. Schmechel 
told Mr. Byrne that she was suffering symptoms associated with her switch to Methadone. 
Plaintiffs further argue the phone conversations are admissible under Rule 803(4) as 
a statement made for the purposes of medical diagnosis. Plaintiffs' arguments fall to 
address the multiple layers of hearsay present If Mr. Lewis or another witness Is allowed to 
testify to these conversations at trial. While Mrs. Schmechel's statements may arguable fit 
this exception to the hei;irsay rule, Plaintiffs cannot establish any exception that would allow 
Mr. Lewis or any other witness to testify to anything Mrs. Schmechel said to them regarding 
the Identity of the alleged caller or what was discussed during the alleged phone 
conversation, 
As discussed in detall In Defendants' Memorandum In Support, before any testimony 
concerning these alleged phone conversations is admissible, the Plaintiffs must establish 
proper evidentiary foundation for the alleged phone calls, which Includes the identity of the 
individual on the other side of the phone conversation, State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 807, 
498 P.2d 1276, 1280 (1972). Therefore, because the alleged phone conversations lack 
appropriate foundation, they should be excluded, 
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3. Plaintiffs' exgerts' testimony, including Dr. Verse's testimony, must be limited to 
their disclosures and degosltlon testimonx. 
Plaintiffs concede they "do not Intend to Introduce any opinion Dr. Vorse has on the 
standard of care In this matter" and that they "will question Dr. Vorse In accordance with 
what is reflected in her deposition testimony and medical records she documented while 
treating Mrs. Schmechel." (Plaintiffs' Response at pp. 8-9). Dr. Vorse clearly testified she 
was not going to offer any standard of care opinions with regards to the Defendants in this 
case. (See Varin Alf. at Ex. 8, Deposition of K. Vorse, M,D. at p, 116, I, 16- p, 117, I. 1.). 
Therefore, Plaintiffs should be precluded from attempting to expand Dr, Verse's testimony 
at trial to offer the Jury any standard of care testimony specifically relating to the Defendants 
or their care of Mrs. Schmechel. 
Plaintiffs intend to show their expert, Dr. Lipman, familiarized with the local standard 
of care through establishing he talked to Dr. Vorse. Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs' 
attempt to qualify Dr. Lipman as an expert, They do object If Plaintiffs attempt to elicit 
testimony from Dr. Lipman or any other of their experts that 9oes directly to the details of 
this case they discussed with Dr. Vorse or any Idaho health care provider in an attempt to 
either bolster their own opinions or offer previously undisclosed expert testimony through 
the guise of "discussions" regarding the standard of care. 
Moreover, if Plaintiffs intend to go into detail regarding the exact nature of the 
conversations they had with Idaho health care providers, Defendants request the Jury be 
excused so such foundation can be laid outside the jury's presence .o the jurors are not 
Improperly tainted. 
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4. Evidence of Sl?eculative economic damages should be precluded. and Plaintiffs 
should be estopped from claiming damages for Mrs. Schmechel's alleged economic 
contributions to the fam/1~ business, 
F>laintiffs claim they should be allowed to recover for damages for "value attributable 
to Mrs. Schmechel's work when another Independent contractor either must fill in for the 
work that she used to perform from the company or Mr. Schmechel must do It himself.' 
(Plaintiffs' Response at p. 9). There are several problems with this argument. First, as 
Defendants already pointed out in their Memorandum in Support, the Schmechels' family 
business is not a proper plaintiff and cannot recover. (Memorandum in Support at p, 15). 
Second, no wages were paid to Mrs. Schmechel for work she performed so her estate Is not 
losing any income from her death. Third, the future value of any services Mrs. Schmechel 
may have continued to offer is purely speculative given the fact she was not paid for past 
services and her chronic pain and other health probleme very well could have prevented 
Mrs. Schmechel from offering ru:ll( services in the future, 
Moreover, Plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming any economic damages 
because Mrs. Schmechel had represented herself as disabled to the federal government 
and was receiving disability payments. (See Varin Aff. at Ex. F). Defendants do not dispute 
the determination Mrs. Schmechel was disabled or ask the Court to make any determination 
as to whether Mrs. Schmechel was entitled to these payments. Rather, Mrs. Schmechel's 
estate should not be allowed to recover in death what she could not be paid In life because 
she was accepting disability payments. In order to continue receiving disability payments, 
Mrs. Schmechel could not work and receive wage$. The Plaintiffs should be estopped from 
claiming damages that Mrs. Schmechel's estate would not be entitled to If Mrs. Schmechel 
was still alive today. Simply stated, Plaintiffs cannot have It both ways and accept disability 
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payments when Mrs. Schmechel wes alive because she allegedly could not work and then 
seek to recover economic damages for work she would have performed had she lived. 
5. Plaintiffs should be precluded from ellqltlng crltlclsm11 of the Defendants' care of 
Mrs. Schmechel that the experts concede do not rise to a breach of the standard of care. 
Plaintiffs' experts have identified criticisms of the Defendants care and treatment of 
Mrs. Schmechel they admit do not rise to a breach of the standard of care. Plaintiffs claim 
these criticisms are relevant to showing how "blurry" the line is between a breach of the 
standard of care al'ld no breach of the standard of care. To establish the prlma facla 
elements of their case, however, Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence a breach of the standard of care. Therefore, It Is anticipated their experts will 
opine on what they believe were actual breaches of the standard of care. The experts' 
criticisms and suggestions of what the Deferidants could have done differently only serve to 
Impugn the Defendants before the Jury and are not relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. The 
purpose of offering such testimony Is to plant seeds of doubt regarding the Defendants' 
overall competency and would likely serve to further complicate an already complicated 
medical malpractice case. Therefore, such criticisms should be excluded under Rule 403 If 
Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs experts attempt to offer such testimony. 
C. Plaintiffi,' and Other Witnesses' Criminal Records Are Admissible. 
The issue of the admlsslblllty of Plaintiffs' and other witnesses' criminal records Is 
extensively briefed in Defendants' Memorandum in Support and Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine. The arguments made there will not be repeated, but It should 
be noted that the Supreme Court has held that when performing the Rule 609 balancing 
analysis, It Is proper to consider whether the witness has an Interest in the testimony. See 
State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 631, 977 P.2d 890, 893 (1999); State v. Pieroe, 107 
Idaho 96, 103, 685 P.2d 837, 844 (1984), Where, as here, the witness has a felony 
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Steven J. Hippler ISB #4388 
J. Will Varin ISB #6981 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 w. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dllle, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMF:oCHEL. Individually, and : 
as SurvlVing Spouse and Personal : 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE : 
' SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT : 
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA: 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE / 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
' Vs. : 
' 
' 
' CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN : 
' IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho : 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and : 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, : 
' 
' Defendants. : 
' 
' 
Case No. CV 05 4345 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, 
M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN 
INSTITUTE'$ JOINDE:~ IN 
OE.FENOANT BYRNE'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
COM!c NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pein Institute 
and join In Defendant Thomas Byrne's Motion in Limine re: Various Issues, filed 
September 29, 2007, and incorporate by reference Defendant Byrne's Motion in Limine 
and Memorandum in support as their own. 
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Keely E. Duke 
!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
Chris D. Comstock 
!SB #6581; cdc@hallfarley.com 
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\2\1-40453\SVF COVER SHEET.DOC 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
I C-; 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL; deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, 
P.A.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Attached are defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.' s proposed special verdict form. 
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DATED this "l~day of October, 2007. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
By·L/,;~~~._µ.'f.&.~=-------
Keely Duke - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
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CERTIFICA1E OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ 1}; day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
POBox2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300 
-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATEOFIDAHO,IN AND FOR THECOUNTYOFTWINFALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KlM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAlN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatory as follows: 
Question No. 1: Did defendant Clinton Dille, M.D., negligently fail to meet the applicable 
standard of health care practice in his treatment and cate of Rosalie Schmechel? 
Answer to Question No. 1: YesLJ No LJ 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, then do not answer Question No. 2 and proceed 
directly to Question No. 3. 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - l 
') ") "' 
"' ' I 
Question No. 2: Was Dr. Dille's negligence a proximate cause ofMrs. Schmechel's death? 
Auswer to Question No. 2: YesLJ No LJ 
Please answer Question No. 3. 
Question .No. 3: Did defendant Thomas J. Byrne negligently fail to rneet the applicable 
standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Rosalie Schmechel? 
Answer to Question No. 3: YesLJ NoLJ 
If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were ''No" you are finished. Please sign the verdict 
form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 3, then answer 
Question No. 4. 
Question No. 4: Was Mr. Byrne's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel 's death? 
Answer tQ Question No. 4: YesLJ NoLJ 
If your answers to Questions No. 2 and 4 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the verdict 
fom1 and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 2 or Question 
No. 4 please answer the next question. 
Instruction for Question No. 5: You will reach this question if you have found that either 
defendants Dr. Dille or Mr. Byrne were negligent, which negligence caused the death of Mrs. 
Schmechel. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties in terms of a 
percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to Questions No. 2 and 4, 
determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate 
line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or 
entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%. 
Question No. 5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the following: 
SPECIAL VERD[CT FORM - 2 
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Answer to Question No. 5: 
To the Defendant, Clinton Dille, M.D, 
To the Defendant, Thomas l Byrne 
Total must equal 
Please answer Question 6. 
% 
___ % 
100% 
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of economic damages, if any, sustained by 
Vaughn Schmech~l? 
Answer to Question No. 6: $ ___ _ 
Question No. 7: What is the total amount of non-economic damages, if any, sustained by 
plaintiffs? 
Answer to Question No. 7: 
Vaughn Schmechel 
Robert Lewis 
Kim Howard 
Tamara Hall 
$ ___ _ 
$ ___ _ 
$ ___ _ 
$ ___ _ 
Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your deliberations. 
Dated: _________ ,, 2007 
Presiding Juror 
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\2\2~404.53\TIUAL BRJEF .OOC 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOW ARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs: 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is an action for medical malpractice arising out of pain management treatment provided 
to Rosalie Schmechel at the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute ("SIPI"), by Clinton Dille, M.D. ("Dr. 
Dille") and Thomas Byrne, P.A. ("Mr. Byrne") ( collectively "defendants") between September 26, 
2003 and October-2, 2003. Plaintiffs are Mrs. Schmechel's husband, Vaughn, and her three children, 
Robert, Tamara and Kim. Plaintiffs allege that defendants breached the standard of care in their 
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, and that such breaches resulted in her death. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rosalie Schmechel was treated at the Southern Idaho Pain Institute ("SIPI") beginning on 
September 26, 2003, relating to complaints of severe low back pain. Prior to presenting to SIPI, Mrs. 
Schmechel had seen several medical providers for chronic low back and right leg pain she had 
experienced for over twenty years. 
In October 1996, Mrs. Schmechel began treatment with Dr. Kimberly Vorse in Ketchum, 
Idaho, for lower back and right leg pain. Mrs. Schmechel continued treatment with Dr. Vorse for pain 
management until September 16, 2003. During the course of Mrs. Schmechel's treatment with Dr. 
Vorse, she continued to experience periods of severe low back and right leg pain. As such, Dr. 
Vorse placed her on a pain management regimen that included the use ofOxyContin (a class II 
narcotic). Mrs. Schmechel was started on OxyContinon April 6, 1999at 20 mg per day, which was 
adjusted throughout Ms. Schmechel's treatment with Dr. Vorse. Dr. Vorse also treated Mrs. 
Schmechel for obstructive sleep apnea, which was diagnosed in June 2002, with C-pap therapy. 
In September 2003, Mrs. Schmechel, who lived in Twin Falls, Idaho, determined that it was 
inconvenient to travel to Ketchum for treatment ofher chronic pain, and her primary care physician, 
Dr. Harris referred her to SIPI. As of September 26, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel was taking 60 mgsof 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF - 2 
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OxyContin, and had been on a near daily regimen of OxyContin for over four years. She was also 
taking, amount other prescriptions, Lortab (a generic Hydrocodone) as needed for break through 
pain. 
During her initial evaluation at SIPI, Mrs. Schmechel met wifu and was evaluated by Mr. 
Byrne, a physician assistant at SIPI, working under the supervision of Dr. Dille. Mr. Byrne and Dr. 
Dille had worked together for over two and one half years as of September 2003 and it was their 
standard practice for Mr. Byrne to see, evaluate and treat the patient, and then to discuss such 
treatment with Dr. Dille subsequently. 
During Mrs. Schmechel's appointment, Mr. Byme performed a physical examination on Mrs. 
Schmechel. In adf!ition, he and Mrs. Schmechel had a lengthy and extensive discussion regarding 
her chronic leg and back pain, her medical history, family/social history, and long-term treatment for 
chronic pain she had receive.cl and was currently receiving. Mrs. Schmechel also reported to Mr. 
Byrne that she had obstructive sleep apnea and was compliant with her C-pap therapy. 
With respect to her current condition, Mrs. Schmechel told Mr. Byme, among other things, 
the following: her current pain management plan was not controlling her pain; she was interested in 
receiving new information in reference to pain management; she believed her medications were not 
working as well as they used to; and her recent severe pain prevented her from taking part in her 
normal daily activities. 
Based upon the history obtained from Mrs. Schmechel, his physical examination of Mrs. 
Schmechel, his lengthy discussion with Mrs. Sclunechel regarding her pain, his experience as a pain 
management physician assistant, and his knowle.dge ofDr. Dille's practice, Mr. Byrne devised a pain 
management plan in which he discontinued the OxyContin and started Mrs. Schmechel on a different 
class If narcotic, Methadone. 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF· 3 
283 
r 
l 
+-
! 
i 
On the following Sunday evening, September 28, 2003, Mr. Byrne called Mrs. Schmechel to 
check on how she was doing with her change in medication. :Mrs. Schmechel indicated she "was 
doing well," and Mr. Byrne advised her to increase her Methadone to 10 mg in the daytime and 10 
mg at night. :Mr. Byrne then instructed Mrs. Schmechel to call him the following day. 
As instructed, Mrs. Schmechel called Mr. Byrne the next day (Monday September 29, 2003). 
Mrs. Sclunechel told him her pain was improving and that she was taking l O mg ofMethadone in the 
day and 15 mg at night. Mr. Byrne instructed Mrs. Schmechel to use the Methadone on a variable 
dose between 10 and 15 mg in the morning and 10 to 15 mg in the evening, and to take a "minimal 
amount of short-acting Hydrocodone for pain control and follow up with me by phone next week." 
Mr. Byrne also told Mrs. Schmechel to call him if she had any problems. 
On Monday, September 29, 2003, Mr. Byrne discussed his care and treatment of Mrs. 
Schmechel with Dr. Dille. Dr. Dille agreed with and approved Mr. Byrne's treatment plan for Mrs. 
Sclunechel. 
After his Monday conversation with Mrs. Schmechel, Mr. Byrne did not hear from Mrs. 
Schmechel again. On the morning of Thursday, October 2, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel passed away. 
Ill. DISCUSSION 
A. Plaintiffs' Cannot State a Prima Facie Case of Medical Malpractice Against Mr. 
Byrne. 
1 . . Elements of a primafacie case. 
To prevai!,on a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements 
of proof: 
(a) The existence ofa physician/patient relationship; 
(b) A duty of care, recognized by law requiring the physician to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct; 
( c) A breach of that duty by conduct which fails to meet the applicable standard of 
care; 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF· 4 
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( d) Proximate cause, and; 
( e )' Actual loss or damage. 
Fullerv. Studer, 122 Idaho 251,833 P.2d 109 (1992); Johnson v. Thomson, 103 Idaho 702,652 P.2d 
650 (1982); Algeria v. Payonl" 101 Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980); IDJI 205. If plaintiffs are 
unable to prove all of these elements, Mr. Byrne is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
2. Plaintiffs will be unable to establish that Mr. Byrne failed to conform to the 
. local standard of care. 
Because plaintiffs will be unable to prove that Mr. Byrne did not follow the local standard of 
care, plaintiffs cannot prove a case of medical malpractice against Mr. Byrne. First, plaintiffs must 
establish the standard of care applicable to Mr. Byrne. Second, they must prove by expert medical 
testimony a breach of the standard of care applicable to a physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, 
Idal10 in September and October of 2003. LC. § 6-1012 and§ 6-1013 (establishing the substantive 
and foundational requirements for expert testimony in medical malpractke cases); Ramos v. Dixon, 
144 Idaho 32, 35, 156 P.3d 533,536 (2007); Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,876, 136 P.3d 338, 
347 (2006); Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,292, 127 P.3d JS7, 195 (2005); Dulaney v. St. 
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Kolln v. St. Luke's Reg. 
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,940 P.2d 1142, 1147-48 (1997); Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214,775 P.2d 
106 (1989); LePelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 422,614 P.2d 962 (1980). 
Under Idaho Code § 6-1012, an essential part of a plaintiffs' case is affirmative proof by 
direct expert testimony that the defendant health care provider failed to meet the applicable standard 
of health care practice in the community in which the care was, or should have been, provided. LC. 
§ 6-1012; see also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3dat 536; Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 
at 876, 136 PJd at347; Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 
820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The expert must 
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testify that the defendant health care provider did not meet the standard of care applicable to his or 
her particular field of health care and specialty. I.C. § 6-1012. Thus, every defendant health care 
provider shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified health care providers in 
the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience, and field of medical 
specialization, if any. See Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P .3d at 536; Edmunds v. Kraner, 
142 Idaho at 876, 136 P.3d at 347; Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 
45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002)Kolln, 940 P.2d at 1150. 
Idaho Code§ 6-1012 must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code§ 6-1013, which provides 
the foundational requirements for the expe1t testimony in medical malpractice cases. The applicable 
standard of practice and the failure to adequately meet the community standard of care must be 
established by the plaintiff by one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witness. I.C. § 6-1013. 
However, before the expert testimony will be admitted into evidence, the plaintiff must first lay a 
proper foundation for the testimony. See Weeks v. Eastern fdaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 
153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.3d 533, 536 (2007); Dulaney, 
137 ldaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 533; Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,905,935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997); 
Watts v. Lyn-ll, 125 Idaho 341,345,870 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1994).Rhodehouse, 868 P.2d at 1227-28. 
A proper foundation establishes that: (a) the opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) the 
opinion is held with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and (c) the ex.pert possesses actual 
knowledge of the applicable community standard which was in place at the time of the alleged 
malpractice. LC. § 6-1013. Accordingly, the expert's testimony must show that he or she 
familiarized himself or herself with the local standard of care for a particular defendant, whether the 
defendant be a physician, thoracic surgeon, nurse, hospital or other health care worker. Id.; see also 
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.2d at 536 127 Idaho 599, 903 P.2d 1296, 1302 {1994). A 
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plaintiff must first establish; as a foundation for expert testimony, that his expert has actual 
knowledge oftbe local standard of care and skill ordinarily exercised by a like provider in the same 
community. Id. This means showing actual knowledge of the standard of care and skill for 
physician assistants in Twin Falls, Idaho, in September and October of 2003. 
If the expert is not from the locality where the alleged malpractice occurred, the expert can 
only demonstrate an adequate familiarity with the local standard of care by consulting with a health 
care provider who practices in the same community where the alleged malpractice occurred. Kolin 
v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d l 142, 1147-48 (1997); Watts v. Lynn, 870 
P.2d at 1304; Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994) (In order to show 
actual knowledge of the local standard ofcare underI.C. 6-1013, the Court has held that a medical 
expert from out of the area must inquire ofa local specialist as to the local community standard of 
care.); Strode, 775 P.2d at 108 (holding that before a board certified specialist from outside tbe state 
may testify as to the local standard of care, the specialist "must, at a minimum, inquire of a local 
specialist to determine whether the local community standard varies from the national standard for 
that board certified specialty.") The term community refers to that geographical area ordinarily 
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was provided. I.C. § 6-1012. 
Thus, plaintiffs must present expert testimony proving that Mr. Byrne failed to meet the standard of 
care for a physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, Idaho in September and October of 2003. 
In this case, all of plaintiffs' experts are from out of state: Mr. Keller is a physician assistant 
practicing in Lakewood, Colorado with no experience in the treatment of chronic pain; Dr. Lordon is 
an anesthesiologist practicing pain management in Murray, Utah; and Dr. Lipman is a doctor of 
pharmacy practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah. As such, none of plaintiffs' experts have practiced 
medicine in Idaho, let alone Twin Falls, Idaho, and, therefore, do not have actual knowledge of the 
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standard of care for a physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, Idaho in September and October 
2003. 
Given that plaintiffs' standard of care experts do not have actual knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care, they must establish that they have adequately familiarized themselves with that 
standard of care in order to testify at trial. Mr. Byrne recognizes that an expert witness may be 
qualified to testify against a medical professional despite the fact that they are not of the same 
specialty. See Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292, 127 P.3d 187, 195 (2005); Clarke v. 
Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 769, 760 P .2d I 182, 1185 (1988)(holding that a board-certified obstetrician-
gynecologistwas qualified to testify as an expert against a general surgeon and a family practitioner 
despite different specialties). However, in Clarke, the Idaho Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance ofa purported expert's knowledge of the defendant medical provider's field: 
,· 
Recognizing the complexity of knowledge required in the various medical specialties, 
more than a casual familiarity with the specialty of the defendant physician is 
required. The witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from experience or 
study ofthe standards of the specialty of the defendant physician sufficient to enable 
him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to those 
particular standards, and not the standards of the witness's particular specialty if it 
differs from that of the defendant. 
Id. 114 Idaho at 769 ( citing Fitzmaurice v. Fly1m, 356 A.2d 887 (1975) with approval). Therefore, 
plaintiffs must establish that plaintiffs' standard of care experts have knowledge acquired from 
experience or study of the standards of a physician assistant such as Mr. Byrne that would enable 
each of them to gi_ve an expert opinion as to whether Mr. Byrne conformed to such standards. As 
will be addressed at trial, plaintiffs' experts have failed to do so. 
3. Mr. Byrne's experts will establish that Mr. Byrne met the standard of care 
in all respects. 
Defendants have retained the following standard of care experts to testify at the trial of this 
matter: Chris Kottenstette, PA-C, Rodde Cox, M.D., William Binegar, M.D., and Bradford Hare, 
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M.D. Each of these experts will testify, from bis particular specialty and based on his actual or 
gained knowledge of the applicable standard of care, that Mr. Byrne met the standard of care in all 
respects. 
4. · The mere fact that an unfortunate or undesirable result occurred does not 
' constitute a breach of the standard of care. 
The mere fact that an undesirable or unfortunate result occms following the medical care 
rendered by Mr. Byrne does not, of itself, establish a breach of the standard of care. See Brown v. 
Tulane Medical Center Hosp. and Clinic, 958 So.2d 87 (La. 2007) (holding "the mere fact that an 
injury occurred,., raises no presmnption or inference of negligence."); Kenyon v. Miller, 756 So.2d 
133, 136 (FL App. 2000)(holding "the law is clear that 'negligence cannot be inferred from the fact 
that the surgery was unsuccessful or terminated in unfortunate results."' Citations omitted); Hirahara 
v. Tanaka, 959 P .2d 830 (Hawaii l 998)("The mere proofof an unfavorable result, without more, will 
not be enough to establish a physician's liability."); Bates v. Meyer, 565 So.2d 134, 137 (Ala., 
1990)(holding that "the existence of an unfortunate result does not raise an inference of 
culpability."); Miller v. Kennedy. 588 P .2d 734 (Wash. 1978)(holding "the instruction challenged 
here accurately states that a bad result or injury in itself is not evidence of negligence; Instruction 
NO. 5 is neither erroneous nor misleading, and the court did not err in giving the instruction to the 
jury."); ~ Crawford v. Anagnostopoulos, 387 N.E.2d l 064 (111. 1st Dist. 1979) ("Proofby plaintiff 
that defendant's treatment was not favorable, that she still suffers from the same condition, does not 
of itself indicate that the defendant failed to use the applicable standard of care. Proof of a bad result 
or mishap is not evidence oflack of skill or negligence."); see also G. Douthwaite, ALEXANDER'S 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL ISSUES§ 3-36 at 129 (1987). 
If liability could be predicated on a perceived "bad" result, without more, strict liability--
rather than negligence--would be the standard. Medical practitioners, however, are not insurers of 
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the correctness of their diagnosis or treatment. Willis v, Western Hospital Ass'g, 67 Idaho 435, 182 
P.2d 950 (1947); ~ also Holton v, Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Ky, 1975). Medicine is not a 
perfect or exact science and infallibility is not, and has never been, the rule in Idaho or elsewhere. 
Thus, in this case,plaintiffs must show more than the mere fact that Mrs. Schmechel died following 
treatment by Mr. Byrne. Plaintiffs must prove that Mr. Byrne did not exercise the care and skill 
reasonably expected of a physician assistant practicing in the Twin Falls, Idaho area in September 
and October 2003. Testimony in this case, including the testimony of defendants' experts, will show 
that Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel entirely appropriate and in accordance with 
the applicable standard of care. Therefore, there was no breach of the standard of care. 
5. Plaintiffs are unable to establish, on a more probable than not basis, that 
Mr. Byrne's care of Mrs. Schmechel caused her death. 
Plaintiffs must also establish that Mr. Byrne's breach of the local standard of cru·e 
proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. See generally Idaho Code § 6-!013; Newberry v. 
Martens. 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d l 87 (2005); Swallowv. Emergency Medicine ofldaho. P.A., 138 
Idaho 589. 594-95, 67 P.3d 68, 73-74 (2003). Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 122 
Idaho 47,830 P.2d 1185 (1992); Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591,818 P.2d 295 (1991).Fau v. 
Greenwood, !OJ Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338 (1980); Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 
1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995). Plaintiffs are required to establish causation by competent 
expert medical testimony because issues such as medical causation a11d medical prognosis are 
typically outside the competency, knowledge or experience of the jury, See Swallow, 138 Idaho at 
594-595, 67 P .3d at 73-74; Dodge-Farrarv, American Cleaning Services Co .• Inc., 137 Idaho 838, 54 
P.3d 954 (2002); Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 102 Idaho 53,625 P.2d 407 (1981); Hall v, 
Bacon, 93 Idaho 1,453 P.2d 816 (1969); Scofield v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital. 90 Idaho 
186, 409 P.2d 107, 109 (1965). In Swallow. the court cited with approval Evans v. Twin Falls 
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Couni:y, 118 ldaho 210,214,796 P.2d 87,91 (1990)(citing 31A Am. Jur.2d, Expert & Opinion 
Evidence. section 207) as follows: 
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or death of a person 
is wholty scientific or so far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the 
average person that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent 
opinion, only an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the cause of 
death, disease or physical condition. 
Swallow, 67 P.3d at 77. 
In Swallow, the court held that a jury oflay people was not qualified to determine the cause 
of the plaintiff's heart attack without the assistance of expert testimony, upon the grounds that such 
causation was, "a matter o.f science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the 
average person." Id. For guidance, the Swallow court examined similar results reached by the court 
in Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844,934 P.23 17 (l 997)(findingthat a lay person was not. 
qualified to testify as to the cause of plaintiff's seizure); Evans, supra (finding that a lay person was 
not qualified to testify as to the cause of his wife's cardiac arrest); and Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 
Idaho 164, 409 P.2d I 10 (1965)(holding that a lay person was not qualified to testify that his 
physician's treatment of him caused his injuries). As such, plaintiffs must establish, through 
competent expert testimony, that Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel is the proximate 
cause of plaintiffs' claimed damages. 
Proximate cause is composed of two factors. Marias v. Marano. 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 
350,352 (1991); Henderson v. Comminco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695-96, 518 P.2d 873, 878-
79 (1974); Doe v .. Sisters of the Holy Cross, J 30 Idaho 705, 708, 946 P .2d 1345, 1349 (Ct. App. 
1995). The first factor of the proximate cause analysis is cause-in-fact (also referred to as "actual 
cause") and the second factor is scope of legal responsibility ( also referred to as "foreseeability"). 
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Marias, 120 Idaho at 13,813 P.2d at 352; Munson v. State Dept. of Highways, 96Idaho 529,531 
P.2d 1174 (1975); Doe, 946 P.2d at 1349. 
The determination of the first factor, cause-in-fact, is a factuai finding of whether defendants' 
action was an actual cause of plaintiffs' harm, Ficarrov. McCoy, 126 Idaho 122, 126-127, 879 P.2d 
30, 34-35 (Ct. App. 1994), while the second factor, legal responsibility, is a legal determination of 
whether legal responsibility'should attach to defendant as a result of defendants' conduct. Henderson 
at 695-696, 518 P:2d 878-879; Ficarro, 879 P.2d at 34-35. 
Furthermore, the negligence of a party will not be considered the proximate cause of 
plaintiffs' damages if such damages would have occurred notwithstanding the negligence. 
Moreover, as noted above, expe1i testimony is required to establish causation in a medical 
malpractice case. Plus, to satisfy the causation element, plaintiffs must demonstrate, through expert 
testimony, that, but for Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, plaintiffs would not have incurred 
the damages they allege in this case. 
The facts at trial will demonstrate that, on a more probable than not basis, Mrs. Schmechel's 
death was a cardiac death, likely a fatal dysrhytbmia. The evidence is expected to show that, in all 
respects, Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel met the applicable standard ofcare of a 
physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, Idaho, and that Mr. Byrne's care did not cause or 
substantially contribute to Mrs. Schmechel' s death. Furthermore, the evidence will show that Mrs. 
Schmechel' s death was the result of her preexisting conditions and/or her failure to properly take the 
medication as prescribed. 
6. Plaintiffs' claimed damages are very limited in this case. 
The Complaint asserts plaintiffs will seek damages for: (1) loss of past and future financial 
support, household services, guidance and assistance; (2) medical and funeral expenses; (3) loss of 
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past and future spousal and parental consortium, love, protection, comfort, companionship, society, 
guidance, advice and intellectual training; and (4) other damages. 
In general, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also the fact 
and amount of damages. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604,611 
(2007); Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168,173,868 P.2d 496, 501 (Ct. App. 1994); Beare v. Stowes' 
Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317,658 P.2d 988,992 (Ct. App. 1983); Fish v. Fleislurum, 87 
Idaho 126, 391 P.2d 344 (1964). The plaintiffs must establish the amount of damages with 
reasonable certainty and sufficient proof must exist to take the measure of damages out of the realm 
of speculation. Griffith, 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604, 61 l, (2007); Homer v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 
Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099, 1106 (2006); Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 773, 118 P.3d 99, !05 
(2005); McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393, 744 P.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1987); 
Eliopulos v. Condo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,643 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ct. App. 1982) ("Damages 
must be proven with reasonable certainty. The existence and extent of damages cannot be left to 
speculation.") 
Where a claim is asserted for the recovery of future damages, the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiffs to prove with reasonable certainty the amount of loss caused by the conduct of the 
defendant. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Jnc., 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604,611 (2007); Homer 
v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,141 P.3d 1099, 1106 (2006); Smith v. Mitton, l40Jdaho 893, 899-
900, 104 P.3d 367, 373-374 (2004); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,810 P.2d 1082, 1098 (1991). 
The award must not be based upon mere conjecture or speculation. Id. 
a. Plaintiffs cannot Recover for Past and Future Lost Income. 
Although there are numerous plaintiffs in the instant action, only Vaughn Schmechel has a 
claim for past or future lost income as a result of Mrs. Schmechel's death. Mr. Sclunechel is unable 
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to remove his claim lost income (past or future) from the realm of speculation. Mr. Schmechel 
claims that he has been damaged by defendants in that Mrs. Schmechel is no longer able to work at 
the family's drywall business. However, there is no record of the company every paying Mrs. 
Schmechel for her work, the amount she worked, the value of her services, or that she ever received 
any payment for her services. As such, Mr. Schmechel is unable to establish the amount of work 
Mrs. Schmechel perfom1ed for the drywall company, that she was ever paid a wage for the work that 
she performed, or the value of her services. Without sufficient evidence as to any of these matters 
Mr. Schmechel is unable to establish these alleged damages with any certainty, or remove such 
. damages from the realm of speculation. 
Further, Mrs. Schmechel had applied for and was receiving disability payments from the 
Social Security Administration. To receive disability payments, Mrs. Schmechel had represented to 
the Social Security Administration that she could not work, and after an investigation, the Social 
Security Administration had agreed. Because of this representation and finding, Mrs. Schmechel's 
estate should be estopped from claiming, after her death, that she was, and would continue into the 
future, to perform work for which her estate should be compensated. 
Mr. Schmechel is unable to provide sufficient evidence of these damages to take them ont of 
the realm of speculation and is not entitled to recover such unsubstantiated claims. Further, plaintiffs 
should be estopped from recovering these damages based on the fact that Mrs. Schmechel had been 
found permanently disabled and was receiving disability pay. 
b. Mr. Scbmecbel Cannot Recover for Services 
Obtained Without Expense, Obligation or Liability, 
As with the claim for past or future lost income, only Vaughn Schmechel has a claim for loss 
of household services resulting from Mrs. Sclnnechel' s death. As a general rule, an individual is not 
entitled to recover the reasonable value of services that he has obtained without expense, obligation 
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or liability. Idaho Code§ 6-1606 specifically precludes the recovery of damages which the plaintiffs 
have already recovered from collateral sources as compensation for the same iajury. Section 6-1606 
provides: 
6-1606. Prohibiting double recoveries from collateral sources. -- In any action for 
personal injuzy or property damage, a judgment may be entered for the claimant only for 
damages which exceed amounts received by the claimant from collateral sources as 
compensation for the personal injury or property damage, whether from private, group or 
governmental sources, and whether contributory or noncontributory. For the purposes of 
this section, collateral sources shall not include benefit paid under federal programs 
which by law must seek subrogation, death benefits paid under life insurance contracts, 
benefits paid by a service corporation organized under chapter 34, title 41, Idaho Code, 
and benefits paid which are recoverable under subrogation rights created under Idaho 
law or by contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is admissible to the court 
after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the court 
to the extent the award includes compensation for damages which have been 
compensated independently from collateral sources. 
The rule prohibiting reduction for collateral source payments applies to insurance benefits, 
payments or other.forms of compensation for which there is a right of subrogation for the payments. 
However, the rule does not apply and should not be applied in cases where the plaintiffs incur no 
expenses, obligation or liability in obtaining the services of which they are seeking compensation, 
and for which the plaintiff has no legal obligation to repay the source of such payments or services. 
See Florida Physicians Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley.452 So. 2d 514,515 (Fla. 1984); Peterson, supra. 
See also, Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1308-9 (8th Cir, 1980); Swanson v. United States 
by and throygh Veterans Admin., supra, 557 F. Supp. at 1047 (upon similar reasoning, defendant 
entitled to an offset equal to the amount of Veterans Administration benefits paid to the plaintiff and 
the present value of future Veterans Administration benefits to be paid to the plaintiff). 
Mr. Sclunechel seeks damages for the value of the household services that Mrs, Schmechel 
provided to him as his wife. However, the evidence will establish that certain household services 
were provided to Mr. Schmechel by Mr. Lewis, Amber Zaccone and Ms. Hall beginning immediately 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRlAL BRlEF - 15 295 
' ' r 
! 
! 
' l ! 
1 ) 
l 
! 
l 
l 
i 
1 
l 
I 
' 
' l 
l 
1 
1 
l 
I 
2. 
'. j 
1 
l i 
' !
after Mrs. Schmechel's death without charge or obligation to repay. Therefore, to the extent that 
Mr. Schmechel has obtained services for household services previously pe1fonned by Mrs. 
Schmechel without out-of-pocket expense, such amounts may not be recovered in this action. 
c. Plaintiffs' Claims for Non-Economic Damages are Limited by 
Idaho Code§ 6-1603. 
Plaintiffs' damages are limited by Idaho Code § 6-1603, which places a limitation on the 
recovery of non-economic damages in personal injury actions. TI1at section provides: 
6-1603. Umitation on Non-economic Damages 
(I) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a 
judgment for Non-economic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the 
maximum amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); provided, 
however, that beginning on July 1, 2004, and each July I thereafter, the cap on Non-
economic damages established in this section shall increase or decrease in accordance 
with the percentage an10unt of increase or decrease by which the Idaho industrial 
commission adjusts the average annual wage as computed pursuant to section 72-
409(2), Idaho Code. 
(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of: 
(a) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant who ·incurred personal 
injury or who is asserting a wrongful death; 
(b) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant, regardless of the number 
of persons responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed. 
(3) If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be infonned of the limitation 
contained in subsection (1) of this section. 
(4) The limitation of awards of Non-economic damages shall not apply to: 
(a) Causes of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct. 
(b) Causes of action arising out of an act or acts which the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt would constitute a felony under state or federal 
law. 
Idaho Code § 6-1603. 
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B. The Comparative Negligence of Other Persons Limits the Liability, if any, of Mr. 
Byrne. 
Mr. Byrne's liability in this case is limited to his own proportion of fault as may be 
determined by the jury. Idaho Code § 6-801 provides that a plaintiffs or decedent's contributory 
negligence or comparative responsibility diminishes a plaintiffs ability to recover against a 
defendant "in the proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative responsibility atmbutable to 
the person recovering." Further, in the event the trier of fact determines that a plaintiffs negligence 
or comparative responsibility is as great as defendant's, plaintiff is barred from recovering damages. 
Furthermore, under Idaho Code § 6-802, the Court is required, when requested by any party, 
to "direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the 
percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to each party .... " I.C. § 6-802. 
Under this section, the Court must submit a special verdict form with the names of every person who 
may have contributed to the plaintiffs' iajury, regardless of whether those persons are parties to the 
action or are protected from liability by operation of!aw. Le'Gall v. Lewis County. 129 ldaho 182, 
923 P.2d 427,430 (1996); Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 677 P.2d 483,485 
(1983); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P.2d 399 (1980); see 
also Hickman Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 758 P.2d 704, 706 (1988). In Pocatello 
Industrial Park Co., the comt held as follows: 
It is established without doubt that, when apportioning negligence, a jury must have the 
opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or not 
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to 
the other ton-feasors either by operation of Jaw or because of a prior release, 
Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 621 P.2d at 403 (quoting with approval Connar v. West Shore 
Eguipment of Milwaukee, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660,662 (1975)). The court went on to 
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explain that negligence cannot be properly apportioned unless all tort-feasors guilty of causal 
negligence are included. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 621 P.2d at 403. 
As a general proposition, a patient may negligently contribute to his or her injuries, 
notwithstanding the negligence of the health care provider. See, 5'&, Adams v. Krueger, 124 ldaho 
74, 76,856 P.2d 864,866 (1993); Birknerv. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1989); 
Coyne v. Cirilli, 45 Or. App. 177, 607 P .2d I 383 (l 980); Brazil v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 986 
(N.D. Ala. 1979) (recognizing the patient's duty to cooperate with his or her physician and to follow 
all proper instructions given to him/her); see also BAn 6.28 (6th Ed.) ("It is the duty of a patient to 
use ordinary and reasonable care to follow all reasonable and proper advice and instructions given by 
his or her [health care provider] regarding the patient's care, activities and treatment. The [heal1h 
care provider] is not liable for any injury resulting from the negligent failure of the patient to follow 
such advice and instructions.") 
In the case at bar, the evidence will show, among other things, that Mrs. Schmechel failed to 
take medications as prescribed and, if her family's testimony is accepted as true, failed to seek 
medical attention when needed. In addition, if certain testimony by the family members is accepted 
as true, then some of the plaintiffs failed to act in a reasonable manner. Until the evidence is 
presented at trial, Mr. Byrne does not know what will or will not be testified to by the witnesses and, 
therefore, are uncertain whether some of plaintiffs should be included on the verdict fonn. Until 
evidence is presented at trial, Mr. Byrne is uncertain whether he will request that Mrs. Schmechel 
and or any or all of the plaintiffs be included on the Special Verdict as responsible parties for l\1rs. 
Schrnechel 's death and plaintiffs' claimed damages. As such, Mr. Byrne reserves the right to amend 
his proposed Special Verdict Form until after some or all of the evidence has been presented at trial. 
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c. Plaintiffs' Counsel May Not Use a "Golden Rule" Argument in Statements to the 
Jury. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "golden rule" arguments, i.e., asking the jurors to 
place themselves in the plaintiffs or defendant's shoes, are improper ifused to "influence the damage 
award." Lopez v, Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (1988). In Lopez, the court 
condoned the argument which was given by defendant's counsel, but only because the defendant's 
argument was moderate in nature and was directed toward the reasonableness of a party's actions. 
The COUit held: 
[T}he "golden rule" argument is only appropriate when used to ask the 
jury to assess the reasonableness of a party's actions by relying on 
their ovvn common sense and life expenses. The golden rule 
argument is never appropriate when used to influence the damage 
award, Our holding is in accord with the majority of courts which 
have decided this issue. 
The "golden rule'.' argument is uniformly prohibited where it is used to inflame the jury and 
encourage an increased damage award, Typically, in such situations, the plaintiff's attorney will ask 
the jury members to place themselves "in the shoes of the plaintiff' by asking them to question 
themselves as to how much they would wish to be paid to endure the damage plaintiff has suffered. 
Such argument is universally recognized as improper because it encourages the jury to depart from 
neutrality and to decide the case on the merits of personal interests and bias rather than on the 
evidence. Jg. at 1231 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the use of any "golden 
rule" argument to influence damages by plaintiffs' counsel would be improper and grounds for a 
mistrial. 
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DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRlEF • 20 3CO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC,5 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the qf:::day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF, by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
POBox2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, }.,f.D. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
DEFENDANT THOMAS J, BYRNE'S TilJAL BRIEF· 21 
/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
./'u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
301 
Keely E. Duke 
!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
Chris D. Comstock 
!SB #6581; cdc@hallfarley.com 
, ,;·msrmcr cou1( 1 
1 ii!N FALLS CO f[lti-i::. FILED. "' 
2007 OCT IO AM 7: 53 
BY 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
-----·-,=;,;-;---(\ · CLEflli 
I \J~-DEPtlTY Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 3 95-8585 
W:\1\2-404.53\Dillo-MII.-Reply.Joinder.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'IBE FIFTH JUDIClAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spoiise and Personal 
Representative of the Estate ofROSALlE 
SCH.MECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOW ARD and TAMARA 
HALL nat\ll'al children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO :PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. a:nd 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
DEFENDANT THOMAS BYRNE, 
P.A.'S JOINDER IN CLINTON 
DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN 
IDAHO P AlN INS'.rlTUTE'S REPLY 
TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE 
Defendant Thomas Byme, P.A., hereby joins in, as if his own, Clinton Dille, M.D. and 
DEFENDANT THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.'S JO!NC>ER IN CLINTON DllLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAf-1O 
PAIN INSTlTUTE'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN L!MINE • I 
Southern Idaho Pain Inslitute's Reply to Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Motions in Limine 
("Reply") filed on or about October 9, 2007. As such, that reply serves as a Reply in S11pport of Mr. 
Byrne's Motion in Limine Re: Various Issues. 
DA1ED this qr!:: day of October, 2007. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
,,,fdt td,L, 
Keeiy: Duke-Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne 
DEPENDANT THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.' S JOl"NDER IN CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO 
PAIN INSTITUTE'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE -2 
303 
-·· ·-· -· .. -·. -· ---- -· ....... . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <f!::- day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANT THOMAS BYRNE, P .A.'S .JO IND ER IN CLINTON DILLE, 
M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANl"S' MOTIONS IN LIMINE, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following; 
lJavid Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
POBox2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneyofor Clinton Dille, MD. and 
Southern ldC1ho Pain lnslitute 
Fax No.; (208) 388-1300 
L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
1./'Telecopy 
viJ.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_iL'f'elecopy 
DEFENDANT THOMAS BYRNE, PA'S JOINDER 1N CLINTON DILLE, M.D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO 
PATN lNSTITUTE'S REPLY TO PLAlNTfFPS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS lN L!MINE - 3 
304 
4el uuz 
·. ,.,_: ... DlSTi:OCT Cl\hi: 
1 WIN Fl\.LLS CG·,,.• ·, · + l1-U·1,,-, FILED . 
Richard E. Hall 
WD7 OCT IO PM 5: 02 1S13 #1253; reh@halln>rloy.com 
Keely E. Duke 
!SB #6044; kcd@h•Ilfatley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
BY I 
,J._CLERK -
Post Office Box 127! ------·DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8S00 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\\4\14•200.456iCAPTION.wp;I 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J _ Byrne 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA Te OFlDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, 
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and 
JOHN DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' JOfNT EXHIBIT LIST - J 
Case No. CV-05-4345 
DEFENDANTS' JOlNT EXHIBIT 
LIST 
305 
Dt:U..1Ll"t:U\l.,.Cl'.. 
COMES NOW the defendants, Thomas Byrne, P.A.; Clinton Dille, M.D., and Southern Idaho 
Pain Institute, by and through their counsels of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and 
Givens Pursley and hereby submits this Joint Exhibir List as of October 10, 2007. Defendants 
reserve the right to withdraw, revise, or supplement any of these exhibits, and/or to submit further 
exhibits to confonn to proof presented at the time oftJ:ial. 
DATED this lo'!!:day of October, 2007. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT EXHJB!T LIST. 2 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTO , P.A. 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
CER'flFICATE OF SERVJCE 
I HER.EBY CER T1FY that on the IO ~ay of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' JOINT EXHIBIT UST, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste, 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 l 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GlVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300 
DEFENDANTS' )OINT EXHIBIT LIST -3 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HllIJd Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
.......-Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
.Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
......--1'elecopy 
') r, ., 
d 'J t 
Southern Idaho Pain Institutc's Medical 
200. Records for Rosalie Soltmeche1 
200(A) 9118/03 Paiienl Information (Southern ldoho Pain Inslituto) 
200(B) 9118103 Completed Puin Questionnaire (Southern Idaho P11in Tnstirure) 
200(C) 9/26/03 Hendwritten Churl Nol< (Southom ldoho Pain Institute) 
200(D) 9/26/03 Drug Contraci (Southetn Idaho Pain Instituto) 
200(E) 9/26/03 Dictated History & Physical (Southern Idaho Pain Institute) 
200(F) 7/13/0l MRI Record from Magic Valley Regional Medical Cenier 
9/26103 Handwrill<n Instructions 
200(G) (Southern Idaho P_oin Inslilute) 
200(H) 9/26/03 Release from Dr. Verst (Southern Idaho Pain Institute) 
200(1) 9/9/03 Letter to Kimberly Vorse from Dr. Verst 
200(J) 9/29/03 Office Note (Southern ldoho Pain Institute) 
200(K) 9/30/03 Office Note (Southern Idaho Pain Institute) 
201, Appt Book- Southern ldoho Pain Clinic for 9126103 
202. 
PhYsicien's Center's Medical Records 
for Rosalie Schm~hel 
202(A) 9/25/03 Chm Note 
8/27 /03 Chan Note 
202(6) 
202(C) 5/6/02 Chm Note 
202(0) 10/24/01 Chan Note 
202(!") 7112/01 Chart Note 
202(F) 5/30101 Chart Note 
202(G) 5/l 1/01 Chart Noto 
202(H) 5/1/01 Chart Note 
202(1) 5/1/01 Diagnostic Jmaging Report 
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1997 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie 
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1996 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie 
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1995 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie 
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VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal Case No. CV 05-4345 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
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vs. 
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corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In anticipation of an issue likely to come before the Court at trial, Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit !his Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum for the Court's review. 
The issue is whether the testimony of Jim Keller, PA, is qualified to testify in this matter, 
and specifically, whether he is qualified to testify as to the local standard of care for 
Twin Falls, Idaho at the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs have retained Jim Keller, PA, as an expert witnesses. Mr. Keller is the 
Director of the Physician's Assistant Program at the Red Rocks Community Coflege in 
Lakewood Colorado. Mr. Keller has reviewed all the pertinent medical records and the 
depositions of Defendant Dille, Defendant Byrne, Kimberly Vorse, M.D., Glen Graben, 
M.D., Stephen Lordon, M.D., Robert Lewis, Kim Howard, Tamara Hall and Vaughn 
Schmechel. In addition, Mr. Keller has spoken over the phone with Tom Rambow, a 
pain management PA in Boise, Idaho and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA 
program at Idaho State University and Mr. Keller has reviewed several articles related to 
Methadone and Sleep Apnea. Mr. Keller's opinions, as set forth in his affidavit, can be 
summarized, in part, as follows: 
1. Mr. Keller is of the opinion that it was a violation of the applicable 
standard of care for Defendant Byrne to begin Mrs. Schrnechel on a new 
drug regimen at the time that Mr. Byrne did, Mr. Byrne did not follow the 
guidelines for medication changes with respect to Methadone, and Mr. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM 
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Byrne failed to monitor the effects of Methadone on Mrs. SchmecheL 
2. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that it was a violation of the standard of 
care for Mr. Byrne· lo fail to communicate by telephone with Dr. Vorse, 
Mrs. Schmechel's previous health care provider and pain management 
physician, and fail to request Mrs. Schmechel's previous medical records. 
3. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that the instructions given to Mrs. 
Schmechel, as indicated in Mr. Byrne's typewritten office note of 
September 26, 2003, were confusing when contrasted against the hand 
written instruction sheet which he also gave to Mrs. Schmeche! because 
Mrs. Schmeche! could have interpreted the instructions to read that she 
was to take an excessive dosage of Methadone in a short period of time. 
4. Additionally, Mr. Keller is of the opinion that Defendant Byrne's initial 
prescription for Methadone and Hydrocodone was a violation of the 
standard of care because Mr. Byrne prescribed more than the amount 
needed for an initial titration. 
It is anticipated that the Defendants will attempt to preclude Mr. Kefler from 
testifying regarding his opinions outlined above. The Plaintiffs respectfully request that 
the Court deny such a request. While Mr. Keller is a physician's assistant, not a 
medical doctor, he is qualified to testify against the Defendant, Mr. Byrne, also a PA. 
Specifically, the Defendants may try to preclude Mr. Keller from testifying based on the 
theory that Mr. Keller is not qualified to testify on the standard of care in Twin Falls at 
the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
However, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosures, Mr. Keller is qualified to 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM 
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testify regarding the standard of care in this case. An out of area expert may familiarize 
himself or herself with the local standard of care in a medical malpractice case by 
conferring with a local care-giver, and opine that at the relevant time and place, there 
were no deviations from the national standard of care. Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 
347 870 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1994). The out of area expert familiar with the national 
standard of care may review the deposition testimony of a local care-giver to become 
familiar with the local standard of care, and subsequently opine that the local standard 
of care is compatible with the national standard of care. Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 
825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992). In Kozlowski, the Plaintiffs' expert, a doctor from Boston, 
read the deposition of the Defendant, the depositions of several nurses, spoke to 
physicians practicing in the local area, Pocatello, and read the deposition of another 
physician practicing in Pocatello, which stated that the standard of care in Pocatelfo was 
the same as the national standard of care. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
Plaintiffs' expert was qualified to testify as to whether the Defendant/physician breached 
the standard of care in Pocatello because he read such depositions. 121 Idaho at 829, 
828 P.2d at 859. 
Similarly, in this case, Mr. Keller (from Denver, Colorado) reviewed the 
deposition testimony of Mr. Byrne, Dr. Dille, Dr. Vorse, Dr. Graben, and Dr. Lordon, and 
spoken to Tom Rambow, PA, and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA program at 
Idaho State University. In his review of the foregoing sources, it was revealed to Mr. 
Keller that the standard of care in Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time Mrs. Schmeche! was 
treated by the Defendants was no different than the standard of care in Denver. 
Accordingly, Mr. Keller is qualified to testify as to the standard of care in Twin Falls at 
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the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated" by the Defendants. 
Moreover, the Defendants may seek to elicit testimony from one of their 
disclosed experts, Chris Kottensette, PA (also from Denver Colorado), who the 
Defendants assert is familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls because it 
didn't deviate from the standard of care in Denver. This presents the Court with the 
following equation: if A=B and B=C, then A=C. If Mr. Kottenstette is from Denver and 
believes the standard of care in Twin falls was no different then the standard of care in 
Denver at the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated," and Mr. Kottenstette is deemed 
qualified to testify as to the local standard of care, then Mr. Keller, also a PA from 
Denver, is deemed familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls at the time of 
Mrs. Schmechel's death, and is therefore qualified to testify in this matter. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court allow Mr. Keller's testimony 
because he is familiar with the local standard of care for Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time 
Mrs. Schmechel sought treatment from the Defendants, and the standard did not 
deviate from the standard of care in Denver, where Mr. Keller was and is a practicing 
PA. 
DATED this I .;J- IAaay of October, 2007. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In anticipation of an issue likely to come before the Court at trial, Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit this Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum for the Court's review. 
The issue is whether the testimony of Jim Keller, PA, is qualified to testify in this matter, 
and specifically, whether he is qualified to testify as to the local standard of care for 
Twin Falls, Idaho at the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs have retained Jim Keller, PA, as an expert witnesses. Mr. Keller is the 
Director of the Physician's Assistant Program at the Red Rocks Community College in 
Lakewood Colorado. Mr. Keller has reviewed all the pertinent medical records and the 
depositions of Defendant Dille, Defendant Byrne, Kimberly Vorse, M.D., Glen Groben, 
M.D., Stephen Lordon, M.D., Robert Lewis, Kim Howard, Tamara Hall and Vaughn 
Schmechel. In addition, Mr. Keller has spoken over the phone with Tom Rambow, a 
pain management PA in Boise, Idaho and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA 
program at Idaho State University and Mr. Keller has reviewed several articles related to 
Methadone and Sleep Apnea. Mr. Keller's opinions, as set forth in his affidavit, can be 
summarized, in part, as follows: 
1. Mr. Keller is of the opinion that it was a violation of the applicable 
standard of care for Defendant Byrne to begin Mrs. Schmechel on a new 
drug regimen at the time that Mr. Byrne did, Mr. Byrne did not follow the 
guidelines for medication changes with respect to Methadone, and Mr. 
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Byrne failed to monitor the effects of Methadone on Mrs. Schmechel. 
2. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that it was a violation of the standard of 
care for Mr. Byrne to fail to communicate by telephone with Dr. Vorse, 
Mrs. Schmechel's previous health care provider and pain management 
physician, and fail to request Mrs. Schmechel's previous medical records. 
3. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that the instructions given to Mrs. 
Schmechel, as indicated in Mr. Byrne's typewritten office note of 
September 26, 2003, were confusing when contrasted against the hand 
written instruction sheet which he also gave to Mrs. Schmechel because 
Mrs. Schmechel could have interpreted the instructions to read that she 
was to take an excessive dosage of Methadone in a short period of time. 
4. Additionally, Mr. Keller is of the opinion that Defendant Byrne's initial 
prescription for Methadone and Hydrocodone was a violation of the 
standard of care because Mr. Byrne prescribed more than the amount 
needed for an initial titration. 
It is anticipated that the Defendants will attempt to preclude Mr. Keller from 
testifying regarding his opinions outlined above. The Plaintiffs respectfully request that 
the Court deny such a request. While Mr. Keller is a physician's assistant, not a 
medical doctor, he is qualified to testify against the Defendant, Mr. Byrne, also a PA. 
Specifically, the Defendants may try to preclude Mr. Keller from testifying based on the 
theory that Mr. Keller is not qualified to testify on the standard of care in Twin Falls at 
the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
However, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosures, Mr. Keller is qualified to 
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testify regarding the standard of care in this case. An out of area expert may familiarize 
himself or herself with the local standard of care in a medical malpractice case by 
conferring with a local care-giver, and opine that at the relevant time and place, there 
were no deviations from the national standard of care. Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 
347 870 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1994). The out of area expert familiar with the national 
standard of care may review the deposition testimony of a local care-giver to become 
familiar with the local standard of care, and subsequently opine that the local standard 
of care is compatible with the national standard of care. Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 
825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992). In Kozlowski, the Plaintiffs' expert, a doctor from Boston, 
read the deposition of the Defendant, the depositions of several nurses, spoke to 
physicians practicing in the local area, Pocatello, and read the deposition of another 
physician practicing in Pocatello, which stated that the standard of care in Pocatello was 
the same as the national standard of care. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
Plaintiffs' expert was qualified to testify as to whether the Defendant/physician breached 
the standard of care in Pocatello because he read such depositions. 121 Idaho at 829, 
828 P.2d at 859. 
Similarly, in this case, Mr. Keller (from Denver, Colorado) reviewed the 
deposition testimony of Mr. Byrne, Dr. Dille, Dr. Vorse, Dr. Groben, and Dr. Lordon, and 
spoken to Tom Rambow, PA, and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA program at 
Idaho State University. In his review of the foregoing sources, it was revealed to Mr. 
Keller that the standard of care in Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time Mrs. Schmechel was 
treated by the Defendants was no different than the standard of care in Denver. 
Accordingly, Mr. Keller is qualified to testify as to the standard of care in Twin Falls at 
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the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated" by the Defendants. 
Moreover, the Defendants may seek to elicit testimony from one of their 
disclosed experts, Chris Kottensette, PA (also from Denver Colorado), who the 
Defendants assert is familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls because it 
didn't deviate from the standard of care in Denver. This presents the Court with the 
following equation: if A=B and B=C, then A=C. If Mr. Kottenstette is from Denver and 
believes the standard of care in Twin falls was no different then the standard of care in 
Denver at the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated," and Mr. Kottenstette is deemed 
qualified to testify as to the local standard of care, then Mr. Keller, also a PA from 
Denver, is deemed familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls at the time of 
Mrs. Schmechel's death, and is therefore qualified to testify in this matter. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court allow Mr. Keller's testimony 
because he is familiar with the local standard of care for Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time 
Mrs. Schmechel sought treatment from the Defendants, and the standard did not 
deviate from the standard of care in Denver, where Mr. Keller was and is a practicing 
PA. 
DATED this j d-' ~ay of October, 2007. 
Tayl r Mossman, 
Attor ey for Plaintiffs 
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE F!FTJ{ JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWTN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE 
SC:HMBCHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs, 
CLINTON DIL!.,E, M,D,, SOUTHERN 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X. 
Defenda11ts. 
Case No. CV OS 4345 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, 
M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN 
INSTITUTE'$ FIRST SUPPLEMENT 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COME NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
("Defendants") and submit the attached proposed supplemental jury instrnction regarding the 
preliminary statement of the case for the jury. Defendants reserve the right to further supplement 
their proposed jury instructions, as well as withdraw any of their previously proposed jury 
instructions. 
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN lNSTJTUTE'S FIRST 
SUPPLEMENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS - l 
32B 
Page ~ ot q 
DEFENDANTS' 
INSTRUCTION NO, __ 
On September 26, 2003, Rosalie Schmeohel sought treatment for her chronic pain from 
the defendant Southern Idaho Pain Institute. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne was a physician 
assistant employed by the Southern Idaho Pain lnstiMe. Mr. Byrne's supervising physician was 
defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. Mr. Byrne obtained a history from Mrs. Sch1nechel and examined 
her on September 26, 2003. Among othet things, Mr. Byme changed Mrs. Schmechel's long 
acting pain medication, Oxycontin, to another long acting pain medication, Methadone. On 
September 29, 2003, Mr. Byrne discussed hls plan ofcare for Mrs. Schmechel with Dr. Dille. 
Dr. Dille agreed with and approved Mr. Byme's treatment plan for Mrs. Schmechel. 
On October 2, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel passed away. Plahitiffs allege that Mrs. Schmechel 
passed away as a result of the care and treatment provided to her by the defendants. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and : 
as Surviving Spouse and Personal : Case No. CV 05 4345 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE : 
' SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. : 
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA: 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE : 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Vs. 
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN : 
' IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho : 
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and : 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, : 
' 
' 
' Defendants. ' 
This matter came before the Court on the parties' Motions in Limine. A hearing was held 
on the parties' Motions in Limine on October 11, 2007. Byron Foster appeared for plaintiffs, 
Keely Duke appeared for defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A., and Steven Hippler and J. Will Varin 
appeared for defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institnte. 
The Court made oral rulings on several motions in open court upon some Motions in 
Limine and reserved ruling on others. Having considered the briefing and oral argument 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1 
submitted by counsel as well as the Court's records and files on this matter and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court's rulings made in open court are incorporated by reference and IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER as follows: 
Based upon the stipulation and agreement of the parties: 
1. Photographs 
a. Autopsy photos of Mrs. Schmechel are inadmissible. 
b. Before any photographs of Mrs. Schmechel taken following her death by the 
Twin Falls County Coroner or Twin Falls Sheriffs Department are displayed in 
the courtroom or offered into evidence, the offering party must inform the Court 
of its intent to offer such photographs and make an offer of proof, outside the 
jury's presence, at which time the Court will rule on the photo's or photos' 
admissibility. 
2. No deposition testimony may be displayed or read to the jury by any party during 
opening statements. 
3. Plaintiffs shall not offer evidence or otherwise pursue any claim for lack of informed 
consent. This Order shall not preclude plaintiffs from pursuing issues regarding the 
adequacy of warnings and instructions regarding the use of the medications at issue in 
this matter, in relation to the claim for medical negligence, and subject to objections to 
any particular question as may be made by opposing counsel and ruling by the Court on 
the same. 
4. No party may comment in closing arguments on the fact the opposing party did not call a 
particular witness that was disclosed on its witness list. 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2 
IT IS FURTHER ORDRED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion in Limine regarding admission of evidence and testimony regarding 
the defendants' care and treatment of other patients is GRANTED in part and DENIED 
in part as follows: 
a. Plaintiffs shall not refer directly or indirectly to the facts and circumstances 
of the defendants care and treatment of any other patients involving adverse 
reactions to medication or death; 
b. Plaintiffs shall not disclose to the jury the facts and circumstances or 
existence of the case entitled JULIE WILLIAMS, on behalf of her minor 
daughter, JALEA LAREN WILLIAMS, and BRANDON WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs, v. CLINTON L. DILLE, M.D., THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A., 
SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, BUSINESS ENTITIES I through 
X, and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, husband and wife, I through X, 
Defendants, Case No. CV-05-1198, consolidated with CV-05-2673 
("Williams v. Dille"). Pursuant to I.R.E. 80l(d)(l), counsel may, however, 
use deposition testimony taken in that matter to impeach a witness, provided 
that they provide the Court and opposing counsel with prior notice of their 
intention to so impeach a witness and provide the Court and counsel with the 
opportunity to excuse the jury and review the portion of the deposition they 
intend to use for impeachment purposes to determine the relevance of such 
prior testimony, and for the Court to rule on any objections and to ensure that 
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the facts and circumstances of the Williams case and its existence are not 
disclosed to the jury. 
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude standard of care testimony from a non-
disclosed witness through the testimony of a testifying witness is GRANTED in part 
and DENIED in part as follows: 
a. No party shall offer or attempt to offer any testimony from a testifying expert 
concerning a non-testifying experts' alleged opinions, or agreement that, the 
standard of care was breached. 
b. This Order does not preclude any party from attempting to qualify its experts 
as properly acquainted with the applicable standard of care provided that the 
Court is provided with prior notice and the opportunity to excuse the jury and 
let the offering party establish foundation for their experts' opinion outside 
the jury's presence. The Court reserves ruling on the actual admissibility of 
any such expert testimony until such experts' testimony is offered at trial and 
the experts' qualifications and familiarity with the standard of care are 
offered to the Court for ruling at trial. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court reserves ruling on the following Motions in Limine: 
I. Admissibility of plaintiffs' or other witnesses' criminal history; 
2. Admissibility of testimony by plaintiffs concerning alleged phone calls between Mrs. 
Schmechel and the defendants; 
3. Admissibility of Dr. Groben's testimony regarding the amount of Methadone Mrs. 
Schmechel consumed, or alternatively, the admissibility of any of Dr. Groben's 
opinions, reports, or conclusions regarding Mrs. Schmechel 's cause of death; 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS !N L!MINE - 4 
4. Admissibility of Dr. Vorse's testimony concerning the standard of care and the 
defendants' care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel as well as proposed testimony of 
Dr. Vorse as to why she did not prescribe Methadone or why Methadone may or 
should not have been prescribed; 
5. Admissibility of expert testimony offered by plaintiffs regarding criticisms of 
defendants' care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel that do not rise to a breach of the 
standard of care; 
6. Admissibility of evidence relating to plaintiffs' economic damage claims. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party or their counsel may refer to (in opening statements 
or otherwise), or elicit from witnesses, the evidence or testimony at issue in the Motions in 
Limine that the Court has reserved ruling npon or that the Court has ruled must first be brought 
to the Court's and opposing counsels' attention outside the presence of the jury before it is 
offered. 
DATED this l(p day of October, 2007. 
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Hon. G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. 
Comstock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and 
pursuant to Rule 51 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby submits the 
following first supplemental proposed jury instructions attached at Exhibit "A." 
A clean copy of the proposed jury instructions is attached as Exhibit "B" for the 
Court's convenience. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED T9i ;.gday October, 2007. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine is 
authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons employed as physician 
assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. A "supervising physician" 
is a person registered by the Board who is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho, who 
is responsible for the direction and supervision of the activities of the physician 
assistant. A "physician assistant" is a person who has been authorized by the Board of 
Medicine to render patient services under the direction of a supervising physician. 
Under applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendants in this case were 
required to have in place a delegation of services agreement which defined the working 
relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Bryne. Pursuant to Board of Medicine 
regulations, a physician assistant may issue written or oral prescriptions only in 
accordance with approval and authorization granted by the Board of Medicine and in 
accordance with the delegation of services agreement and shall be consistent with the 
regular prescriptive practice of the supervising physician. 
Under the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's Delegation of Services Agreement 
applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct an initial evaluation of 
patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and physical, and thereafter document his 
findings and recommendations. It was the duty of Dr. Dille, pursuant to the Board of 
Medicine regulations and the Delegation of Services agreement, to review the 
recommendations of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter confirm his findings and to determine a 
treatment plan. 
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 •; 3· a d () 
the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of care. 
Idaho Code§ 54-806(2); IDAPA § 22.01 .03; 2003 Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Delegation of Services Agreement 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine is 
authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons employed as physician 
assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. A "supervising physician" 
is a person registered by the Board who is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho, who 
is responsible for the direction and supervision of the activities of the physician 
assistant A "physician assistant" is a person who has been authorized by the Board of 
Medicine to render patient services under the direction of a supervising physician. 
Under applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendants in this case were 
required to have in place a delegation of services agreement which defined the working 
relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Bryne. Pursuant to Board of Medicine 
regulations, a physician assistant may issue written or oral prescriptions only in 
accordance with approval and authorization granted by the Board of Medicine and in 
accordance with the delegation of services agreement and shall be consistent with the 
regular prescriptive practice of the supervising physician. 
Under the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's Delegation of Services Agreement 
applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct an initial evaluation of 
patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and physical, and thereafter document his 
findings and recommendations. It was the duty of Dr. Dille, pursuant to the Board of 
Medicine regulations and the Delegation of Services agreement, to review the 
recommendations of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter confirm his findings and to determine a 
treatment plan. 
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or 
the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of care. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
To prove that Thomas Byme, P.A., was "negligent," the Plaintiff must prove, by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of ail of the competent evidence, that Thomas Byrne, 
P.A., failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such 
standard of care existed in September of 2003 through October of 2003 with respect to the class 
of health care provider to which Thomas Byrne, P.A., belonged and in which he was functioning. 
A physician's assistant, such as Thomas Byrne, P.A., shall be judged in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physician's assistants in the same community taki!1g into account 
his training, experience and field of specialization. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
To prove that Clinton Dille, M.D., was "negligent," the Plaintiff must prove, by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. Dille, failed 
to meet the applicable standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such standard of 
care existed in September of 2003 through October of 2003 with respect to the class of health 
care provider to which Dr. Dille belonged and in which he was functioning. 
A pain management specialist and anesthesiologist, such as Dr. Dille, shall be judged in 
comparison with similarly trained and qualified pain management specialist and anesthesiologist 
in the same community taking into account his training, experience and field of specialization. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 342 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
The words "reckless conduct" when used in these instrnctions and when applied to the 
allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean acts or omissions 
under circumstances where the actor knew or should have known that the acts or omissions not 
only created an umeasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of probability 
that such harm would actually result. 
IDJI2d 2.25. (Modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ____ _ 
OTHER ') 1 ., d·..) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary 
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the 
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful 
person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circm11stances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
IDJI2.d 2.20. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that geographical area 
ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the medical care 
complained of was or allegedly should have been provided. 
J.C.§ 6-1012 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 315 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, b\f and throu9h their attorneys of record, David E. 
Com.stock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, ,md Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and 
hereby submit the following Bench Brief rE1garo1ing the Plaintiffs proposed "Reckless" 
jury instruction. 
Plaintiffs proposed "Reckle,,;s" instruction reads as follows: 
The word "reckless conduct" when m,ed in these instructions and when 
applied to the allegatiorn; in this c;asi,, means more than ordinary 
negligence. The word me,ms actions ial<en under circumstances where 
the actor knew or should h,ive known that the actions not only created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to anotl1er, but involved a high degree of 
probability that such harm would actually reimlt. 
This instruction is a modii'fed versrcin ::rf IDJI 2d, 2.25. The only meaningful 
difference is to insert the words "reckless cc,nduct" in place of "willful and wanton," 
which the Idaho Courts have rEqJeatedly h,,ld are words that have the same legal 
definition, as the comments to the instruction cle,arly state. In the proposed instruction, 
Plaintiffs are proposing only to w;e the word "mckless" as being defined, since that is 
the only word the jury will hear throughout the, trial regarding what the Plaintiffs in this 
case. are claiming against each of the Defendants. The experts in this case who 
address this subject will similarly focus on whether the Defendants' conduct was 
"reckless" or not. As such, the Plaintiffs submit that it makes sense for the jury only to 
be instructed on this particular tenn. 
Further, the definition provided by the Plaintiffs in this regard is entirely consistent 
with Idaho law. The appellate col;rts have n,pe,atedly held that 
"reckless" conduct refers tc:, conduct whe~, the actor does or fails to do an 
act "knowing or having giason to J5.!1.9W facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize that his conduct not onl)' creates an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involves a high degree of 
probability that such harm would result. " 
PLAINTIFFS' BENCH BRIEF RE: PROPOSEO, "~:EGKELSS" JURY IN:STRUCTION-2 
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See, e.g. Harris v. Idaho Dept. of Nealth & w,~Jfam, 123 Idaho 295, 299 847 P .2d 1156, 
1160 (1992); Jacobsen v. City or Rathdrum, '115 Idaho 266, 270 756 P.2d 736, 740 
(1988). 
It is not necessary, under Idaho law, tbit a plaintiff prove a defendant actually 
knew of the high risk of harm and proceeded in the face of that risk regardless. There is 
no requirement that the plaintiff prove intentional misconduct. Intentional misconduct is 
not the same as reckless conduct. 
An intentional conduct standard would apply if it were requilred that Defendants 
actually knew of the high risk o"I harm. Howe,ver, under the circumstances were a 
defendant did not know, but should have known, the acts are mckless rather than 
intentional. There is no requirem,,1nt under lda,ho law with regard to "reckless conduct' 
that the defendant engaging in such conduct hs1s to actually know and proceed in the 
face ·of that knowledge. It is enc ugh for "recklE1ss conduct" if the defendant, in either 
acting or failing to act "should ha01e known." This standard has been in effect at least 
since the case of Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho Ei47, 448 P.2d 653 (1968), wherein the 
Idaho Supreme Court adopted the Second R.e,statement of Torts. § 500 definition of 
reckless conduct. The definition ie as follows: 
"The actor's conduct is in rnckless disregard of the safety 01' another if he 
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the 
other to do, knowing or having reason tc, !mow of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to reali1:e, not only that his conduct creates an 
unreasonable risk of physi::al harm to anolher, but also that such risk is 
substantially greater than that whic:h iB 11e1cessary to make his conduct 
negligent." 
PLAINTIFFS' BENCH BRIEF RE: P ROPOSElD "R.ECl<ELSS" JURY INSTRUCTION- 3 
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Based on the above, the Pl:,1intlffs resp1:s{)ti'ully request that the Plaintiffs' 
proposed instruction regarding thei definition of "Reckless" is the proper and appropriate 
a jury instruction for this issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMl"JTED This JS,_ day October, 2007. 
-----~;t~ 
Byron Fost-e_i:, 
Attorn1,ys for 'Plaintiff 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. 
Comstock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and 
and hereby submits the following objections to the Defendants' proposed jury 
instructions. Defendant Byrne and Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
submitted separate proposed jury instructions, but the Plaintiffs respond in this single 
set of objections. 1 
DEFENDANT BYRNE 
1. Jury Instruction #14: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the grounds 
that it is redundant and/or cumulative with Defendant Byrne's proposed instruction #15 
and a later instruction that adequately covers the applicable standard of care. 
2. Jury Instruction #15: See objection to #14. This instruction is redundant 
and /or cumulative with instruction #14. In addition, proposed instructions 14 and 15 are 
redundant with the instruction that gives the general standard of care to the jury. There 
is no need for the jury to be instructed on how to apply the standard of care to the 
Defendants twice. 
3. Jury Instruction #19: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it a comment on the evidence, and it is not a proper instruction. "Unfortunate result" 
language is not approved by IDJI. I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not authorize the use 
of such an instruction. See also, IDJI 217 and Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159 45 
P.3d 810, 815 (2002) ("(a)n instruction should not be given that states 'negligence may 
not be presumed from the fact of an accident alone."') 
4. Jurv Instruction #20: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
1 Defendant Byrne did not number his proposed jury instructions, but for purposes of this objection, 
Plaintiffs refer to his proposed jury instructions as though Defendant Byrne numbered them in sequential 
order. 
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it is a comment on the evidence, it is redundant, and it is better suited for cross 
examination. 
5. Jury Instruction #21: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is a comment on the evidence, 
and it argumentative. 
6. Jury Instruction # 22: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is a comment on the evidence, 
and it argumentative. 
7. Jury Instruction #23: Plaintiffs object to this proposed instruction on the 
basis that it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is redundant, and is 
not necessary to instruct the jury on their duties as fact-finders. 
8. Jury Instruction #24: Plaintiffs object to this proposed instruction on the 
basis that it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is redundant, and is 
not necessary to instruct the jury on their duties as fact-finders. 
9. Jury Instruction #25: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is not proper. The proper test for proximate cause is not a "but for" test, but rather "a 
substantial factor." In determining actual cause, the Idaho Supreme Court has held the 
"substantial factor" test is appropriate when there are multiple possible causes that lead 
to the injury or death. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 288 127 P.3d 187, 191 
(2005). In the instant case, there are multiple possible causes for Mrs. Schmechel's 
death. Therefore, the appropriate language for the jury to consider is whether the 
Defendants' negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
10. Jury Instruction #27: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it fails to address that the jury may consider economic damages as an element of 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
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damages. In addition, use of the term "conjugal relationship" will be confusing to the 
jury and prejudicial to Plaintiffs because the term is commonly understood to refer only 
to the sexual aspect of the marital relationship. While "conjugal" is defined as "of, 
pertaining to, or characteristic of marriage," "conjugal rights" is defined as "sexual rights 
and privileges conferred on husband and wife by the marriage bond." Thus, the use of 
the term "conjugal" is improper. The language should be "love, comfort, care, society 
and companionship," thus denoting all of the factors which compromise the marital 
relationship. 
11. Jury Instruction #28: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is already addressed in instruction #27and it is argumentative. 
12. Jury Instruction #30: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is confusing and does not fit the facts of this case. A preexisting condition has to be 
symptomatic before the Defendants can attempt to apportion the damages to the 
preexisting condition. Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 9.02, concerning "Aggravation of 
Pre-existing Conditions" direct the jury to apportion damages, "if possible, between the 
condition, pain, or disability prior to this occurrence and the condition, pain, or disability 
caused by this occurrence and assess liability accordingly." The instruction also states: 
"(y)ou should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence, 
or any aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of 
this occurrence." 
Furthermore, a comment to IDJI 940, which concerns damages, similarly states 
that "[i]f there is no evidence that a pre-existing bodily condition was causing pain or 
disability before the occurrence, then the activation of that pre-existing condition makes 
a defendant liable for all damages proximately caused to the person in that condition. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS· 4 
) 
3 5 ') ' J 
Oc 1-2007 14:42 COMSTOCK & .· lJ 208-344-7721 
There is no prior pain or disability to segregate." In this case, Mrs. Schmechel was not 
symptomatic of the condition brought on by ingesting Methadone; she wasn't even 
taking Methadone before she sought treatment from the Defendants. Her pain and 
other medical conditions were under control prior to being prescribed Methadone by the 
Defendants. Accordingly, because Mrs. Schmechel's death is not something that 
normally would have resulted from her medical condition prior to seeking treatment from 
the Defendants, a jury instruction regarding Mrs. Schmechel's preexisting condition is 
entirely inappropriate. 
13. Jury Instruction #34: Plaintiffs object to this verdict form with respect to 
Question No. 1 and Question No. 3. Both questions ask whether the Defendants 
"negligently failed" to meet the standard of care. This question presents the jury with a 
double negative, as if the jury must find that the Defendants were "negligently negligent" 
in their treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. The question should read, "Did the Defendants 
fail to meet the standard of care?" or "Were the Defendants negligent?" Asking the jury 
to find that the Defendants negligently failed to meet the standard of care imposes too 
high of a burden on the Plaintiffs to prove that the Defendants did not meet the standard 
of care in this case. 
DEFENDANT DILLE 
1. Jury Instructions# 13, 14, 15, 16: Plaintiffs object to these instructions 
on the basis that when taken together, they are cumulative and/or redundant. In 
addition, the instructions would have the jury believe that the Plaintiffs cannot prove that 
the standard of care is indeterminable, and thus any testimony from experts outside of 
Twin Falls should be disregarded. "(i)n the community in which such care was provided 
at the same time it was provided" is prejudicial language because it will raise a question 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 5 
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in the jury's mind regarding the out-of-area experts' ability to testify regarding the 
applicable standard of care. 
2. Jury Instruction #18: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is a comment on the evidence, it is argumentative, and it is covered elsewhere in 
separate instructions, such as in instructions 20 and 21. 
3. Jury Instruction #19: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is a comment on the evidence and it is argumentative. In addition, "unfortunate result" 
language is not approved by IDJI. It is an improper comment on the evidence and 
invades the province of the jury. I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not authorize the use of 
such an instruction. See a/so, IDJI 217 and Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159 45 P.3d 
810, 815 (2002) ("(a)n instruction should not be given that states 'negligence may not 
be presumed from the fact of an accident alone."') 
4. Jury Instruction #22: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is a comparative negligence instruction. The facts of this case do not support a 
comparative negligence defense, and the jury should not be so instructed. There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the Plaintiffs actions or alleged failures to take 
actions contributed to the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
5. Jury Instruction #25: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the grounds 
that it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, and it is confusing for the 
jurors. In a previous instruction, the jurors are told to rely on their common sense, yet 
this instruction informs them to do otherwise. Giving this instruction would violate the 
principles set forth in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The Court in 
Sheridan held that "(u)nlike the elements of duty and breach of duty, there is no 
statutory requirement explicitly stating proximate cause in medical malpractice cases 
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must be shown by direct expert testimony." Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical 
Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). Testimony concerning proximate cause is 
governed by the rules of evidence regarding opinion testimony by lay witnesses and 
experts under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 and 702. Id. Thus, unlike the Defendants' 
jury instruction suggests, the jury does not have to rely on expert testimony to determine 
proximate cause, and submitting such an instruction to the jury would be in error. 
6. Jury Instruction #26: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, such as proposed instructions 20 
and 21. 
7. Jury Instruction #30: Plaintiffs contend that this is improper because the 
jury should not be instructed to consider whether any damages awarded are considered 
taxable income. If the Court decides to instruct the jury regarding the Plaintiffs' award 
the instruction should not read as the Defendants propose, but rather, "You are 
reminded that in deciding the issue of damages you are not to consider whether there 
are any tax consequences associated with an award for damages." !name v. Brewer, 
132 Idaho 377,380 973 P.2d 148, 151 (1999). 
8. Jury Instruction #31: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that 
it is a comparative negligence instruction. The facts of this case do not support a 
comparative negligence defense, and the jury should not be so instructed. There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the Plaintiffs actions or alleged failures to lake 
actions contributed to the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
THE VERDICT FORM 
Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute and Defendant Byrne used 
different language on their verdict forms. Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain 
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Institute asked the jury, in one question, whether the Defendants breached the 
applicable standard of care, and if so, whether the breach was a proximate cause of the 
Plaintiffs' damages. Defendant Byrne separated breach and proximate cause into two 
questions. Plaintiffs submitted a special verdict form that that asked the breach and 
proximate cause question as a single question, rather than separating it into two 
questions. Plaintiffs now request that the question be separated into two questions, as 
proposed by Defendant Byrne. Defendant Byrne's proposed instruction is easier for the 
jury to understand and also clarifies the jury's verdict once it is rendered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This Jj_ day October, 2007. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. 
Comstock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and 
pursuant to Rule 51 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby submits the 
following proposed second supplemental jury instructions, attached hereto as Exhibit 
A clean copy of the proposed jury instructions is attached as Exhibit "B" for the 
Court's convenience. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This "Z. ¥day October, 2007. 
David E( Comstoc 
Attorneys for Plaintiff · 
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Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Richard E. Halt 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
You are instructed that under Idaho law, each Defendant is only responsible for its 
negligent percentage of causative fault. In the event you should choose to attribute fault on one 
or more of the Defendants, that Defendant will only be responsible for that percentage of 
negligence, if any. Any percentage of negligence attributed to Rosalie Schmechel will reduce 
the total amount of damages awarded to Plaintiffs in that percentage. In answering the damage 
questions, you must disregard any allocation of causative fault and award the total amount of 
damages, if any, you find the Plaintiff to have incurred. You must not in any way reduce the 
damages which you award because of the allocation of negligence. You should award a figure 
wbich will fully and fairly compensate Plaintiffs for all the damages they have sustained 
regardless of their cause. 
You are further instructed that if you find, in allocating the percentages of fault, that the 
negligence attJ.ibuted to the decedent Rosalie Schmechel, is equal to or greater than the 
negligence of any one defendant, Plaintiffs will recover no damages from that Defendant. 
In advising you as to the effect of your verdict, I do not mean to express an opinion as to 
whether any or all of the parties contributed to the cause of Plaintiff's damages. That is for you 
to determine. 
IDJI No.: 271 (modified) 
Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 
579 P.2d 683 (1978); I. C. §6-801. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
You are instmcted that under Idaho law, each Defendant is only responsible for its 
negligent percentage of causative fault. In the event you should choose to attribute fault on one 
or more of tbe Defendants, that Defendant will only be responsible for that percentage of 
negligence, if any. Any percentage of negligence attributed to Rosalie Schmechel will reduce 
the total an1ount of damages awarded to Plaintiffs in that percentage. In answering the damage 
questions, you must disregard any allocation of causative fault and award the total an10unt of 
damages, if any, you find the Plaintiff to have incurred. You must not in any way reduce the 
damages which you award because of the allocation of negligence. You should award a figure 
which will fiilly and fairly compensate Plaintiffs for all the damages they have sustained 
regardless of their cause. 
You are further instmcted that if you find, in allocating the percentages of fault, that the 
negligence attributed to the decedent Rosalie Schmechel, is equal to or greater than the 
negligence of any one defendant, Plaintiffs will recover no damages from that Defendant. 
In advising you as to the effect of your verdict, I do not mean to express an opinion as to 
whether any or all of tbe parties conhibuted to tbe cause of Plaintiffs damages. That is for you 
to detennine. 
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DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
COME NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D., the Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
and Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. ("Defendants") and lodge the following objections to 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions filed October 8, 2007 as well Plaintiffs proposed 
supplemental jury instructions filed during trial as follows: 
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GENERAL OBJECTION 
Defendants object to the use of any jury instructions or special verdict form they 
did not propose. Defendants further object to the failure to instruct the jury using the 
jury instructions and special verdict form they have proposed. Defendants reserve their 
right to object to the Court's proposed final jury instructions and special verdict form and 
to object to any further supplemental jury instructions Plaintiffs may propose. 
OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9: Defendants object to 
Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 9 because it omits the final sentence of the first 
paragraph of IDJl2d 2.30.2 that states "It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or 
damage likely would have occurred anyway." This sentence is necessary under the 
circumstances because of the other factors, including Mrs. Schmechel's health 
conditions, which could have caused or contributed to her death. 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10 AND 11: Defendants 
object to Plaintiffs' proposed Instructions Nos. 10 and 11 because they are unnecessary 
because if Mr. Byrne or Dr. Dille are found negligent, this negligence will be imputed to 
the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. The Defendants do not contest this issue and 
including an instruction on this topic will only serve to confuse the jury. 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13: Defendants 
object to Plaintiffs' proposed Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 on the basis they do not 
accurately reflect Idaho law as contained in Idaho Code§ 6-1012 and§ 6-1013, which 
contain the requirements that both the applicable standard of care and a breach of the 
applicable standard of care be established by direct expert testimony. As noted by the 
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Idaho Supreme Court in Robertson v. Richardson, 115 Idaho 628, 769 P.2d 505 (1987) 
on re-hearing (1989) instructions embodying the precise language contained in Idaho 
Code § 6-1012 and § 6-1013 are the appropriate instructions to be used at trial. 
Further, Plaintiffs' proposed instructions omit any reference to the standard of care as it 
existed at the time and place of the alleged occurrence. Defendants herein incorporate 
by reference Section IV. C. of Defendant Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's 
Trial Brief which discusses the use of appropriate statutory language in jury instructions. 
Defendants further object to these instructions to the extent they include a 
reference to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. As discussed above, reference to the 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute is unnecessary and confusing. 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14: Defendants object to 
Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 14 because it is inconsistent with the definition of 
evidence instruction given to the jury at the beginning of trial. Any instruction provided 
to the jury on this topic should be consistent with the Court's initial instruction on this 
topic. 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Defendants object to 
Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 15 because instructing the jury on the topic of 
insurance only serves to highlight the fact that insurance may be involved in this case. 
Defendants prefer that no instruction on the topic of insurance be given to the jury. 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 17: Defendants object to 
Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 17 because the evidence does not support the 
assertion that Mrs. Schmechel provided any financial support to Mr. Schmechel, which 
therefore makes any recovery of financial support speculative and not reasonably 
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certain. Plaintiffs' Instruction No. 17 is misleading as to what damages maybe properly 
recovered in this wrongful death action. The evidence introduced at trial does not 
support an award of any economic damages to any of the Plaintiffs. 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 18 AND 19: Defendants 
object to Plaintiffs' proposed Instructions Nos. 18 and 19 because as discussed above, 
Plaintiffs have not proven they are entitled to recover any economic damages in this 
action. Defendants further object to these instructions to the extent the standard 
mortality listed in the instructions is inconsistent with the mortality tables contained in 
Idaho Code. 
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM: Defendants object to 
Plaintiffs' proposed special verdict form because it is confusing in its identification of the 
parties in its Interrogatories. Because any negligence found on the part of Dr. Dille or 
Mr. Byrne will be imputed to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute, it is unnecessary and 
confusing to refer to it on the special verdict form. The special verdict form should 
rather refer only to the individual defendants Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille. 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 32: Defendants object to 
Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 32 as an improper instruction which purports to 
define the standard of care in contradiction to Idaho Code § 6-1012 and § 6-1013. 
Defendants further object to Instruction No. 32 on the basis that it is not supported by 
the evidence introduced at trial and that the Instruction improperly comments upon the 
evidence. Plaintiffs further have not introduced any direct expert testimony supporting 
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the proposed Instruction No. 32 as required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. 
Under these sections, direct expert testimony is required to establish a breach of the 
standard of care by a health care provider. It is improper to attempt to establish the 
standard of care through reference to a statute without any direct expert testimony. The 
instruction also improperly comments on the specific evidence of this case rather than 
defining the law and allowing the jury to draw its own conclusions from the evidence 
adduced at trial. 
Defendants affirmatively assert that their conduct was consistent with all 
applicable statutes, rules and regulations, and agreements between the Defendants and 
instructing the jury on Board of Medicine regulations will only serve to confuse and 
mislead the jury in this medical negligence litigation. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot meet the necessary elements to establish that 
violation of the Rules for the Licensure of Physician Assistants ("Regulations") or the 
Delegation of Services Agreement constitutes negligence per se. Specifically, the 
Regulations and Delegation of Services Agreement are subject to interpretation and do 
not clearly define a required standard of conduct Further, because testimony at trial 
indicates that Dr. Dille would not have changed Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. 
Schmechel, plaintiffs are unable to establish that any alleged breach of Regulations or 
Delegation of Services Agreement was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
Negligence per se occurs where a person violates an ordinance or state law. 
Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001 ). Negligence per se is a 
question of law for the court. Id. Negligence per se is no different from ordinary 
negligence. Id. Negligence per se only acts to remove duty and breach from the jury. 
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Id. (citing Slade v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 
(1991 )). A claim of negligence per se requires that plaintiffs prove: (1) the statute or 
regulation clearly defines the standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation was 
intended to prevent the harm caused by defendant's act or omission; (3) plaintiff is a 
person of the class the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the 
violation must be a proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged injury. O'Guin v. Bingham 
County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005). 
A. The rules for the licensure of Physician Assistants and the Delegation of 
Services Agreement do not clearly define the required standard of conduct. 
The Regulations and Delegation of Services Agreement are subject to 
interpretation and do not clearly define a required standard of conduct, and therefore 
cannot give rise to negligence per se. 
In Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 (2001), the district court held that 
the defendant was negligent per se for violation of I.C. § 49-633 for passing the 
plaintiff's vehicle on the right side and a subsequent collision. On appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed each of the four requirements of negligence per se and 
determined that the statute did not allow for negligence per se. The Ahles court found 
that elements 2 and 3 were met as the statute was intended to protect motorists and 
plaintiff fell within the protected category. However, the court held that "the standard of 
conduct described in I.C. § 49-633, ... is far from clear and requires statutory 
interpretation including consideration of problematic definitions of terms used in the 
statute." Id. 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at 1079. The Ahles court held there were 
numerous questions as to certain terms in the statute that were subject to interpretation, 
and that "[a]ll of these questions add to the complexity of the statute and show that the 
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standard of conduct derived from interpreting the statute is less than clear and not 
easily ascertained or applied." Id. As such, the Ahles court held that I.C. § 49-633 did 
not satisfy the test with regard to the "description of a clear standard of conduct. 
Accordingly, the alleged violation of the statute in this case cannot be deemed 
negligence per se." Id. 
In the instant matter, the Rules for the Licensure of Physician Assistants and the 
Delegation of Services Agreement are subject to interpretation and do not clearly define 
a required standard of conduct. Specifically, Idaho Administrative Code 22.01.03.28 
SCOPE OF PRACTICE, indicates various items which a physician assistant may 
perform if included in the Delegation of Services Agreement including, "Diagnose and 
manage minor illnesses or conditions" and "manage the health care of the stable 
chronically ill patient in accordance with the medical regimen initiated by the supervising 
physician." IDAPA 22.01 .03.28.03 and 22.01 .03.28.04. 
The Regulations do not define minor illnesses or conditions or major illnesses or 
conditions or what constitutes chronically ill. Nor does the Code define the term 
manage. As such, what constitutes a minor or major illness or condition is ambiguous 
and left to interpretation. In addition what constitutes managed care of a stable 
chronically ill patient is left to interpretation. If Mrs. Schmechel's chronic pain was a 
minor condition (as testified to by Mr. Byrne) the Regulations would allow Mr. Byrne to 
diagnose and manage such condition. 
Further, in addition to the ambiguousness of the Regulations, one must further 
consider the added layer of interpretation required by the Delegation of Services 
Agreement. Specifically, the Regulations provide a general outline of care that a 
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physician assistant may perform as included in the Delegation of Services Agreement 
and other documents that help define the scope of the physician assistant. 
The Regulations define a "Delegation of Services (DOS) Agreement" as: 
A written document mutually agreed upon and signed and dated by the 
physician assistant and supervising physician that defines the working 
relationship and delegation of the duties between the supervising 
physician and the physician as specified by Board rule. The Board of 
Medicine may review the written delegation of services agreement, job 
descriptions, policy statements, or other documents that define the 
responsibilities of the physician assistant in the practice setting, and may 
require such changes as need to achieve compliance with these rules and 
to safeguard the public. 
Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille's 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement provides in 
part, "the physician assistant ... will be utilized in the initial evaluation for patients seen 
in this facility ... Patients will require a full history and physical on initial visit. Pertinent 
findings will be documented and recommendations made. The recommendations will 
be reviewed by the supervising physician to confirm finding and determine a treatment 
plan." As testified to by Dr. Dille, the Delegation of Services Agreement was not 
intended to in any way limit Mr. Byrne's scope of practice as compared to what was 
allowed by the Regulations. Further, both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne testified that the 
Delegation of Services Agreement allowed Mr. Byrne to evaluate Mrs. Schmechel and 
alter her pain management regimen from OxyContin to Methadone, without first 
discussing the case with Dr. Dille. 
Further, the Administrative Code states that the Board of Medicine may also 
review "job descriptions ... or other documents that define the responsibilities of the 
physician assistant in the practice setting .... " IDAPA 22.01 .03.06. The Delegation of 
Services Agreement itself includes this language indicating that the scope of Mr. 
Byrne's practice further requires analysis of the Job Description. Mr. Byrne's job 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 8 371 
description with the Southern Idaho Pain Institute indicates that the physician assistant 
will be utilized in the initial evaluation for patients, and that such patients "will require a 
full history and physical on initial visit and will be documented with appropriate findings 
and recommendations. This will include the ordering of appropriate tests and 
prescribing of medications." (Exh. 233, p. 2). 
A review of the Regulations, Delegation of Services Agreement, Job Description 
and the testimony of both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille indicate that Mr. Byrne's care and 
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel and Dr. Dille's supervision of such care did not violate the 
Regulations or Delegation of Services Agreement. At the very least, such evidence and 
testimony indicates that the Regulations and Delegation of Services Agreement require 
interpretations of undefined and ambiguous terms and do not clearly define a required 
standard of conduct. Therefore, neither the Regulations nor the Delegation of Services 
agreement give rise negligence per se. 
B. Plaintiffs' negligence per se instruction should not be given because the 
alleged violation of the regulations was not the proximate cause of Mrs. 
Schmechel's death. 
As stated above, the fourth requirement to find that violation of a statute or 
regulation equates to negligence per se is that "the violation must have been the 
proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078. Plaintiffs 
cannot meet this requirement as Dr. Dille testified in both his deposition and at trial, that 
with regard to Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, he "could not see where [he] 
would have made any changes or done anything different than what Mr. Byrne had." 
(Deposition of Dr. Dille, p. 29, II. 17-21). Because Dr. Dille would not have changed the 
treatment provided by Mr. Byrne to Mrs. Schmechel, plaintiffs are unable to establish 
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that any alleged breach of the Regulations or Delegation of Services Agreement was 
the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
Therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish that the Rules for the Licensure of Physician 
Assistants or the Delegation of Services Agreement clearly define a required standard 
of conduct for Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille. Nor can plaintiffs establish that any alleged 
violation of the Regulations or Delegation of Services Agreement was the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. As such, plaintiffs are unable to meet the necessary 
requirements for negligence per se and plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction should not 
be given. 
PLAINTIFFS' UNUMBERED PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS RE: STANDARD 
OF CARE: Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed supplemental standard of care 
instructions because they do not accurately reflect the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 
6-1012 and 6-1013. Defendants specifically object to Plaintiffs proposed standard of 
care instruction relating to Dr. Dille and its reference to Dr. Dille as a "pain management 
specialist." Dr. Dille is a board certified anesthesiologist who practices pain 
management; he is not, nor does he claim to be, a board certified "pain management 
specialist." Including such reference in a jury instruction may confuse the jury regarding 
the appropriate standard of care applicable to Dr. Dille. 
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PLAINTIFFS' UNLIMBERED PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS RE: "RECKLESS 
CONDUCT": 
A. The evidence does not support instructing the jury on the definition of 
reckless conduct. 
Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed reckless conduct jury instruction 
because it is not supported by the evidence adduced at trial and because it improperly 
states the law of Idaho as it relates to any alleged reckless conduct in this case. 
Plaintiffs have not shown that any Defendants' conduct was reckless in this action. 
They have not submitted sufficient evidence on this issue to create a jury question as to 
whether or not Defendants' conduct, even if found negligent, rose to reckless conduct. 
The only direct expert testimony opining that Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of 
Mrs. Schmechel was "reckless" was offered by Dr. Lipman. Dr. Lipman's testimony was 
not sufficient, however, to support a reckless jury instruction. When asked if Mr. Byrne's 
conduct was "reckless," Dr. Lipman testified that: 
So, it's not possible to say that anyone apriori, everybody up front, will 
know which patient will suffer the adverse effects; but it's absolutely 
scientifically valid to say that anyone who understands what the law 
requires us to understand to use these medications will know that 
someone will suffer these adverse effects; and tragically in this case, I 
believe it was Mrs. Schmechel. 
Trial Testimony of Dr. Arthur Lipman at p. 75, II. 5-12 
Dr. Lipman went on to testify that he did not "think it was intentional harm," and that he 
did not think there was "any malice." Id. at p. 76, II. 13-16. 
This testimony, which is the only testimony offered in support of a reckless 
instruction, simply does not support such an instruction. By Dr. Lipman's own 
admission, it was impossible to know whether a particular patient, such as Mrs. 
Schmechel, would suffer an unexpected adverse result because she took Methadone. 
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The fact one patient out of the thousands of patients Mr. Byrne treated during his 
employment at Southern Idaho Pain Institute may have suffered an unexpected, 
unfortunate result does not support a finding Mr. Byrne acted recklessly in prescribing 
Methadone or was reckless in the manner in which he prescribed the drug. All drugs 
have risks and with almost all drugs there is some small percentage of patients that will 
not react will to the drug. 
Under the Plaintiffs own proposed definition of "reckless," Mr. Byrne's conduct 
was not reckless because there was no "high degree of probability that such harm 
would actually result." Dr. Lipman's testimony shows there was no way of knowing 
before hand that Mrs. Schmechel could suffer an immediate adverse reaction to the 
Methadone. See Galloway v. Walker, 140 Idaho 672, 676-677, 99 P.3d 625, 629 - 630 
(Ct. App. 2004) (Discussing IDJl2d and noting that "it appears to set a higher standard 
of proof for the plaintiff, requiring a showing that the defendant's conduct "involved a 
high degree of probability that ... harm would actually result." )(emphasis added). Dr. 
Lipman's testimony shows Plaintiffs cannot establish any "reckless" conduct because it 
was impossible for Mr. Byrne to know "with a high degree of probability" that harm 
would actually result when he prescribed Mrs. Schmechel Methadone, and, in the face 
of this knowledge, prescribed it anyway. 
B. Plaintiffs' proposed reckless instruction does not accurately reflect Idaho 
law concerning "reckless disregard." 
Plaintiffs attempt to utilize an instruction intended to be used in punitive damages 
cases in this matter. It should be noted that Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their motion 
to amend to allege punitive damages. In an attempt to pierce the statutory non-
economic damages cap, however, Plaintiffs propose a modified version of IDJl2d 2.25 
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("Definition of willful and wanton"), which is based upon Restatement of Torts Second 
section 500. The comments to this Restatement section make clear, however, that 
reckless conduct "must involve an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial 
physical harm, and the probability that it will so result must be substantially greater than 
is required for ordinary negligence." Rest. 2d of Torts§ 500, comment (a) (Westlaw 
2007). Comment (g) to Section 500 further highlights the difference between mere 
negligence and recklessness. This comment provides: 
g. Negligence and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs 
from negligence in several important particulars. It differs from that form of 
negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, 
unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor 
adequately to cope with a possible or probable future emergency, in that 
reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action, 
either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with 
knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable 
man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but 
also from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with 
knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be 
reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially 
greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct 
negligent. The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct 
involving only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent 
is a difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so 
marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind. 
(emphasis added). 
Although Plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish the application of the definition 
of recklessness found in Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 
(2005), the definition contained in Athay is consistent with the above Restatement 
comment and Idaho law. In Athay, the Supreme Court held that reckless disregard 
required the actor to actually perceive the danger and continue his course of conduct 
any way. Id. Defendants submit this standard is what is required under Idaho law and 
IDJl2d 2.25's comments are not consistent with Idaho law. 
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C. Instructing the jury on recklessness at the close of evidence and before it 
has found Defendants negligent is improper and prejudicial. 
Plaintiffs seek to instruct the jury on recklessness so they have a basis to pierce 
the statutory non-economic damages cap of Idaho Code § 6-1603 if the jury finds the 
Defendants negligent and returns a damage award above the cap. The issue of the 
statutory non-economic damage cap is only relevant if the jury awards non-economic 
damages in excess of the cap. In fact, the statute specifically provides the jury should 
not be informed of the cap during its deliberations. See I.C. § 6-1603(3) "(If a case is 
tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained in subsection (1) 
of this section."). Therefore, the jury should only be instructed to determine whether or 
not the Defendants' conduct was reckless, if and only if, it first finds the Defendants 
negligent and it awards damages in excess of the non-economic damage cap. 
Instructing the jury on recklessness before it has found negligence and awarded 
damages in excess of the cap prejudices the Defendants and will only serve to confuse 
the jury on the Plaintiffs' burden in this negligence case. Instructing on reckless conduct 
before a finding of negligence implies that the conduct was not only negligent, but may 
have also been reckless. Such instruction encourages the jury to weigh the Defendants' 
alleged conduct against the wrong standard. Instead of first determining if the conduct 
was negligent and then considering whether it was reckless, the jury may first decided 
the conduct was not reckless, but since it was not reckless, it was negligent. In 
essence, giving a reckless jury instruction before a finding of negligence improperly 
lowers the Plaintiffs' burden of proof on the duty and breach elements of the prima facia 
elements of any negligence action. 
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tyioreover, instructing the jury on reckless conduct could inflame the jury's 
passion and prejudice them against the Defendants. The mere implication that there 
was reckless conduct, when such finding is simply not supported by the weight of the 
evidence or even Dr. Lipman's testimony, unduly prejudices the Defendants. 
DATED this 1_~ of October 2007. 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON PA 
~~~K 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. 
Byrne, P.A. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
s for Defendants 
Cli Dille, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain Institute 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and : 
' as Surviving Spouse and Personal : 
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE : 
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT : 
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA: 
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE : 
' SCHMECHEL, deceased, : 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN : 
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho: 
' corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and : 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 05 4345 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS 
TO COURT'S PROPOSED FINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
COME NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D., the Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
and Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. ("Defendants") and lodge the following objections to the 
Court's Draft Final Jury Instructions as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS TO COURT'S PROPOSED FINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
380 
GENERAL OBJECTION 
Defendants object to the use of any jury instructions or special verdict form they 
did not propose. Defendants further object to the failure to instruct the jury using the 
jury instructions and special verdict form they have proposed. Defendants reserve their 
right to further object to the Court's proposed final jury instructions and special verdict 
form and to object to any further supplemental jury instructions Plaintiffs or the Court 
may propose. 
OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTIONS (pp. 5-6): Defendants object to the 
Court's two proximate cause instructions (pp. 5-6 of Draft Final Instructions) because 
they are redundant and prejudicial. The Court omitted the language, "It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway" from 
IDJl2d 2.30.2. Defendants recognize such instruction is consistent with those used in 
the recent cases of Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005) and 
Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007), however, the omitted language 
should be used under the current circumstances where there is substantial evidence 
that many other factors could have contributed to or caused Mrs. Schmechel's death. 
For example, Dr. Smith testified that Mrs. Schmechel's death was likely caused by a 
sudden cardiac event. There is further no dispute that Mrs. Schmechel had numerous 
comorbid factors, which could have contributed to her death. For these reasons, the 
omitted sentence from IDJl2d 2.30.2 should be included so the Defendants are not 
improperly held responsible for factors over which they had no control. 
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The second proximate cause instruction (p. 6) is redundant and prejudicially 
emphasizes the substantial factor test. Including duplicative instructions on this topic 
prejudices Defendants because it encourages the jury find the Defendants liable, even 
through there is ample evidence that many other factors likely contributed to Mrs. 
Schmechel's death and that Defendants' conduct was not a substantial factor in the 
death. 
STANDARD OF CARE INSTRUCTION (p. 10): Defendants submit that Dr. Dille 
and Mr. Byrne should be referenced in the Court's standard of care instruction at page 
10 of the proposed instructions. Both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne's qualifications establish 
them as experts and the jury should be instructed to consider their testimony as expert 
testimony beyond simple factual testimony recounting the events at issue in this matter. 
NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTION (p. 13): Defendants object to the inclusion of a 
standard negligence instruction without any reference to Mrs. Schmechel. As currently 
drafted, this instruction may confuse the jury regarding the Plaintiffs' burden of 
establishing medical negligence against the Defendants. Idaho Code sections 6-1012 
and 6-1013 have very specific requirements for establishing medical negligence, and 
this standard is included in other instructions. Providing a garden variety negligence 
instruction without clarification that this instruction only applies to Mrs. Schmechel may 
confuse the jury. 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY INSTRUCTIONS (pp.14-15): Defendants object to 
instructions referring to Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne as employees of the Southern Idaho 
Pain Institute. While these facts are not disputed, it is confusing and unnecessary to 
include an instruction on this topic because any negligence found on behalf of Dr. Dille 
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or Mr. Byrne will be imputed to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. Defendants submit 
that Southern Idaho Pain Institute should not be included upon the Special Verdict Form 
and that no instruction regarding Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne's employment status should be 
submitted to the jury. 
RECKLESS CONDUCT INSTRUCTION (p. 16): Defendants object to instructing 
the jury on recklessness because such instruction is not supported by the evidence and 
the proposed instruction does not accurately reflect Idaho law. Defendants' position is 
discussed in more detail in their Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, 
which is herein incorporated by reference, and will not be repeated here. Specifically, 
there is no evidence supporting a finding that Dr. Dille was negligent and instructing the 
jury on reckless conduct may improperly taint its finding on liability and damages while a 
finding of recklessness only becomes relevant if liability is found and damages are 
awarded in excess of the statutory non-economic damages cap. 
Moreover, a more appropriate way to handle this issue is to allow the jury to 
weigh the evidence and return a verdict on liability and damages, and then, if it finds 
damages in excess of the statutory non-economic damages cap, to send the jury back 
with an instruction to determine if it finds the conduct to be negligent. This procedure 
has been utilized recently by at least one other 5th district trial court, Judge Elgee in the 
recent trial of Neiwert v. Rae, CV 043002. There, the Court refused to instruct the jury 
on recklessness until it first determined liability and damages. The jury did not find any 
liability, however, and therefore, the jury was never instructed on recklessness. 
DAMAGES INSTRUCTION (p. 18 and p. 21): Defendants object to the Court's 
proposed damage instruction to the extent it refers to "the decedent's age and normal 
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life expectancy." Here, there is no evidence that Mrs. Schmechel was an "average" 
female for her age. In fact, all evidence, including the Plaintiffs' and their experts' 
testimony, points to the fact Mrs. Schmechel had many health conditions that would 
likely reduce her life expectancy. Moreover, Plaintiffs' economist testified he did not 
take any of Mrs. Schmechel's health factors into consideration when making his 
damage calculations. Given Mrs. Schmechel's many health issues and the unrebutted 
testimony of Dr. Smith concerning Mrs. Schmechel's expected life expectancy, the 
"standard" life expectancy should not be used. Defendants further submit the word 
"normal" should be omitted from numbered paragraph (2) in the Court's instruction on p. 
18. 
DATED this ~f October 2007. 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON PA 
TOCK 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. 
Byrne, P.A. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
A orney for Defendants 
Cli ille, M.D. and Southern 
Idaho Pain Institute 
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DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED 
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF 
DR.LIPMAN 
COME NOW defendants, Thomas J. Byrne (hereinafter "Mr. Byrne") and Clinton Dille, 
M.D. ("Dr. Dille") by and through their counsel of record and submit this Objection to Plaintiffs' 
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Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Lipman. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Monday October 29, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel indicated they intended to call Dr. Lipman 
as a rebuttal witness. The email from Mr. Foster stated "the rebuttal will be limited to the testimony 
of Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare regarding the graph that Mr. Hippler drew and the testimony that at 
a 30 mg dose, the therapeutic line will never be crossed." Defendants indicated that they would 
object to Dr. Lipman testifying to this matter on rebuttal, as it was addressed in direct and was not 
proper rebuttal testimony. Mr. Foster then wrote another email indicating that "[w]e also intend to 
have Dr. Lipman rebut Mr. Kottenstette's assertion that Mr. Byrne could have started Mrs. 
Schmechel's dosage at 90-120 mgs. per day ... There are also other matters which constitute rebuttal 
which we may go into with Dr. Lipman." Defendants object to plaintiffs calling Dr. Lipman to 
testify on rebuttal, as he has already offered his opinions regarding these matters and on rebuttal 
would merely rehash these same opinions. Such testimony would be cumulative and should be 
excluded pursuant to the Court's discretion in governing rebuttal testimony, I.R.E. 403 and I.R.C.P. 
43(b )(5). As the Court made clear during its discussion on plaintiffs' motion to exclude Dr. Binegar, 
the parties have already offered numerous witnesses discussing the "science" related to Methadone 
and Hydrocodone. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to get a last bite at the apple by calling Dr. 
Lipman to go through these issues one last time for the jury, when such matters were directly covered 
in plaintiffs' case-in-chief. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Rebuttal evidence is evidence which "explains, repels, counteracts or disproves evidence 
which has been introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party." State v. Olsen, 103 ldaho 278,647 
P.2d 734, 737 (1982). "Within limits, the [trial] judge may control the scope of rebuttal testimony; 
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may refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant testimony; and may control the scope of 
examination of witnesses." State v. Knight, 128 Idaho 862,865,920 P.2d 78, 81 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"The pem1issible scope of rebuttal rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent abuse of 
such discretion, the trial court's ruling will be sustained on appeal." McAtee v. Faulkner Land & 
Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393,397, 744 P.2d 121, 125 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Idaho appellate courts have routinely excluded cumulative rebuttal testimony. In McAtee, the 
district court excluded rebuttal testimony regarding certain matters that had been addressed in the 
case-in-chief. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to exclude the rebuttal 
testimony citing to Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, stating "proffered evidence merely elaborated what 
they had already attempted to establish during their case-in-chief. Although the evidence was offered 
for the purpose of rebuttal, it was cumulative in content." Id. In Findley v. Woodall, 86 Idaho 439, 
387 P.2d 594 (1963), the Idaho Supreme Court similarly affim1ed the trial court's refusal to allow 
rebuttal testimony that was cumulative. Id. at 443, 387 P.2d at 596. 
Further, in addition to the Court's discretion regarding admissibility of rebuttal testimony and 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b )(5) provides in part that "after the 
examinations on both sides are once concluded, the witness cannot be recalled by the same party 
without leave of the court." 
In the instant action, Dr. Lipman was on the stand over the course of two days and offered 
numerous opinions regarding various matters in the case, including, matters that plaintiffs have 
indicated they are calling him for rebuttal. The Court should not allow plaintiffs to call Dr. Lipman 
on rebuttal to merely rehash opinions he has previously provided, as such testimony was addressed in 
direct and is therefore cumulative and improper rebuttal testimony: 
• Dr. Lipman has already testified regarding the "science" involved regarding the chart 
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of 30 mg of Methadone a day and lesser amounts. 
Plaintiffs have indicated that they intend to call Dr. Lipman on rebuttal to discuss the chart 
drawn by Mr. Hippler as well as Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare's testimony regarding such chart. 
However, the concept of the chart was clearly addressed by Mr. Hippler on cross-examination of Dr. 
Lipman and plaintiffs' re-direct examination of Dr. Lipman: 
Q: Okay. And I just want to understand something from a mathematical 
standpoint okay? And that is, if we take, mathematically, in terms of risk of 
respiratory depression, if we take a patient and start them at 30 milligrams a day total 
Methadone dose, and we keep them on that does for six days, the risk of respiratory 
depression on your curve that you showed us, would be greater than if we took a 
patient and started them at 5 milligrams--or pardon me- 10 milligrams a day for a 
day, 20 milligrams a day for a day, and 30 milligrams a day for four days. 
Mathematically that would be, make less risk of respiratory depression? 
A: That's not a correct statement, the reason being that it is not the issue of the 
total number of milligrams, and that's what you keep focusing on. The issue 
clinically is that, whatever dose we start at, it will have an effect that will keep 
increasing until the drug is at a steady state level. Ifwe pick the correct dose initially, 
then at steady state we'll be getting the desired effect without the bad effects. Ifwe 
pick too low a dose initially, at steady state we will get not enough of the desired 
effect without the bad effect. Ifwe pick too much of the, or too high a dose initially, 
we're going to get side effects even before we reach stated state. The concern is that 
once we start a dose, we must watch ... The concern is that once we pick a dose, we 
must monitor the patient until the patient is at steady state and not increase the dose 
until we've reached steady state, because if our dose is too high, then we're 
increasing the risk of a bad outcome; and I firmly believe that's what happened in 
this case. 
Q: Mathematically speaking, ifwe were to draw the line starting at 30 milligrams 
a day and drawing the curves, and if we were to draw a line starting at less than 30 
milligrams for the first couple of days and then at 30 milligrams, that line would be 
below the one at 30, would it not? 
A: Yes. But you don't know -
Q: Thank you. 
A: -- where that intersects with the therapeutic window, which is why you don't 
change the dose. 
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Q: And I'm just talking about the line itself and the math on the chart that you 
showed us. 
A: The answer is correct but irrelevant to the clinical medicine. (October 19, 
2007, trial testimony of Dr. Lipman, pp. 109-111, 11. 9-11). 
In addition to discussing these matters on cross-examination, Dr. Lipman testified regarding 
these theories on re-direct: 
Q: With regard to the math that Mr. Hippler was talking about, explain why a 
strict mathematical calculation is inapplicable in a situation with regard to the dosing 
and titration of Methadone? 
A: The issue is not the dose, as I've said. The dose will give us a certain level. 
In some people that will be a good level. In some people it will be too low. In some 
people it will be too high. Whether the initial starting dose is ten milligrams three 
times a day or 15 milligrams twice a day, we get the same total serum level. We're 
going to get better analgesia with three types a day, be we won't get any less risk. 
The problem is that we must not adjust the dose until we know that we're within the 
safe effective range. 
And it's the same point that keeps coming up again and again that I'm sure 
the jury now understands, and that is, that we have to use the medication in a time 
sequence consistent with the way that the human body eliminates it. Otherwise we 
have a risk of disaster. (Id. pp. 116-117, 11. 7-1). 
The mathematical issues relating to the levels of Methadone discussed by counsel for Dr. 
Dille and Dr. Lipman at trial in plaintiffs' case-in-chief are the exact same issues as addressed by 
defendants' experts Dr. Hare and Mr. Kottenstette in relation to the graph drawn by Mr. Hippler. As 
such, Dr. Lipman has already testified regarding this matter, and any additional testimony would 
merely be cumulative and should be precluded an improper rebuttal testimony. Further, as the Court 
is aware, Dr. Lipman has discussed the issue of "therapeutic window" at length. Again, the Court 
has indicated that the parties have already offered expansive testimony regarding the "science" of 
Methadone and plaintiffs should not be given one last chance to elicit such testimony in the guise of 
rebuttal testimony. 
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• Mr. Kottenstette testified that there are a nnmber of charts that practitioners use for 
purposes of determining a conversion dose in switching a patient from OxyContin to 
Methadone. 
Plaintiffs indicate that they further intend to question Dr. Lipman on rebuttal regarding 
alleged testimony of Mr. Kottenstette that 90-120 mgs of Methadone would have been an appropriate 
starting dose and within the standard of care. However, plaintiffs have misconstrued Mr. 
Kottenstette's testimony. Mr. Kottenstette testified that there are a number of charts a practitioner 
can use out there and he was merely using Dr. Lipman's PowerPoint slide as an example of how you 
take a chart and determine the conversion dose. Mr. Kottenstette did not testify that starting Mrs. 
Schmechel on a 90-120 mgs of Methadone would have been within the ,,tandard of care. Plaintiffs 
had Dr. Lipman testify regarding these slides and therefore any additional testimony regarding this 
matter would be cumulative and should be excluded, 
• Any other rebuttal testimony offered by Dr. Lipman should also be examined for 
determination of whether it is truly rebuttal testimony or merely a rehashing of 
previous testimony offered by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have indicated they may offer rebuttal testimony of Dr. Lipman on other issues that 
have not yet been disclosed. Defendants request that such topic areas be addressed prior to offering 
Dr. Lipman as a witness in order to determine whether such areas of testimony are true rebuttal or 
mere! y a rehashing of previous testimony. 
• Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding the pharmacokinetics of Methadone were 
properly disclosed, and regardless, plaintiffs failed to object to such testimony at trial. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Mr. Byrne failed to properly disclose Mr. Kottenstette's expert 
opinions with regard to the pharmacokinetics of Methadone, and that in fairness, they should be 
allowed to call Dr. Lipman in rebuttal to address these undisclosed opinions. 
Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding the pharmacological properties of Methadone were 
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properly disclosed. Mr. Kottenstette's disclosure, at page 4, indicates that Mr. Kottenstette would 
testify as follows with respect to the pharmacologic properties of Methadone: 
[T]hat Mr. Byrne has an appropriate understanding for a physician assistant of the use 
and prescription of Methadone. As such, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify 
that he disagrees with Dr. Lipman's assertion that Mr. Byrne appeared to lack the 
appropriate level of understanding of the pharmacologic properties of Methadone; 
rather, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify Mr. Byrne had an appropriate 
understanding of the pharmacology of Methadone and prescribed it appropriately. 
In addition, page 10 of the disclosure indicates that "Mr. Kottenstette is expected to respond 
to and/or rebut opinions provided by medical expert witnesses called by plaintiffs, including, but not 
limited to, ... Arthur Lipman .... " and that "Mr. Kottenstette will address, explain and render 
expert opinions with regard to relevant medical subjects within his expertise, including, but not 
limited to, Class II narcotics (including OxyContin and Methadone), Hydrocodone .... " As such, 
Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding the pharmacologic properties of Methadone were properly 
disclosed. 
Second, plaintiffs failed to object to such testimony during Mr. Kottenstette's testimony, and 
cannot now allege some unfairness in an attempt to allow in improper cumulative rebuttal testimony. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs should be precluded from calling Dr. Lipman as a rebuttal witness to testify 
regarding matters that plaintiffs have already offered testimony and evidence on, as such testimony 
would be cumulative and improper rebuttal testimony. 
DATED this X)~day of October, 2007. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& BLANT, N, P.A. 
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1. I am an attorney with the firm Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., the attorneys 
for defendant Thomas J. Bryne and, in that capacity, I make the following declaration t based upon 
my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit" A" is a true and correct copy of an email received from 
Byron Foster dated October 29, 2007 at 10:38 a.m. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of an email received from 
Byron Foster dated October 29, 2007 at 12:29 p.m. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho, that the foregoing is true 
and correct.. 
Keely E. Duke 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3;>:s?J-day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DECLARATION OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF DR. UPMAN, by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
David Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
601 W. Bannock ST. 
PO Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute 
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
VHand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
v-Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
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Kathy A. Savell 
From: Keely E. Duke 
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 10:44 AM 
To: Kathy A. Savell 
Subject: FW: SCHMECHEL 
print 
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From: Byron Foster [mailto:byron@bvfoster.com] 
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 10:38 AM 
To: Keely E. Duke; sjh@givenspursley.com; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us 
Subject: SCHMECHEL 
Counsel: 
I want to inform you that we intend to call Dr. Lipman in rebuttal. The rebuttal will be limited to the 
testimony of Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare regarding the graph that Mr. Hippler drew and the testimony 
that at a 30 mg dose, the therapeutic line will never be crossed. 
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Kathy A. Savell 
From: Keely E. Duke 
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 1 :48 PM 
To: Byron Foster; Steven J. Hippler; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us 
Cc: Chris D. Comstock; Will Varin; Kathy A. Savell; Cathy A. Pontak 
Subject: RE: SCHMECHEL 
Byron: 
Thank you for your e-mail. 
First, with respect to your new assertion that we somehow did not disclose Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding 
the pharmacologic properties of Methadone (no such objection was made during the course of Mr. Kottenstette's 
testimony by you or Mr. Comstock), please look at Mr. Kottenstette's disclosure, page 4, the first full paragraph, 
that discloses that Mr. Kottenstette would testify as follows with respect to the pharmacologic properties of 
Methadone: 
"that Mr. Byrne has an appropriate understanding for a physician assistant of the use and prescription of 
Methadone. As such, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify that he disagrees with Dr. Lipman's 
assertion that Mr. Byrne appeared to lack the appropriate level of understanding of the pharmacologic 
properties of Methadone; rather, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify Mr. Byrne had an appropriate 
understanding of the pharmacology of Methadone and prescribed it appropriately." 
In addition, we also disclosed on page 1 O of our disclosure that "Mr. Kottenstette is expected to respond to and/or 
rebut opinions provided by medical expert witnesses called by plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, ... Arthur 
Lipman .... " and that "Mr. Kottenstette will address, explain and render expert opinions with regard to relevant 
medical subjects within his expertise, including, but not limited to, Class II narcotics (including OxyContin and 
Methadone), Hydrocodone .... " 
Dr. Lipman has already testified regarding the concepts depicted in the illustrative charts used by Dr. Hare and 
Mr. Kottenstette and, therefore, we will request that you not be permitted to rehash this same ground under the 
improper guise of rebuttal testimony. 
Next, you are misstating Mr. Kottenstette's testimony regarding Dr. Lipman's PowerPoint slide. Mr. Kottenstette 
testified that there are a number of charts a practitioner can use out there and he was merely using Dr. Lipman's 
PowerPoint slide as an example of how you take a chart and determine the conversion dose. 
Lastly, with respect to your statement that Dr. Lipman ffifil' go into other areas, we strongly disagree that you 
would not need to disclose those opinions to us or the Court prior to a hearing on this matter tomorrow. 
We look forward to addressing these issues with the Court tomorrow. 
Best regards, 
Keely 
From: Byron Foster [mailto:byron@bvfoster.com] 
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 12:29 PM 
To: Steven J. Hippler; Keely E. Duke; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us 
Subject: RE: SCHMECHEL 
We also intend to have Dr. Lipman rebut Mr. Kottenstette's assertion that Mr. Byrne could have started 
Mrs. Schmechel's dosage at 90-120 mgs. per day. By the way, Defendants never disclosed that Mr. 
Kottenstette would testify to either one of these issues and in fact did not disclose that he would testify 
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as an expert on the pharmacodynamics or pharmacokinetics of Methadone so we think it only fair to be 
allowed to rebut these non-disclosed opinions. There are also other matters which constitute rebuttal 
which we may go into with Or Lipman. Since we do not believe we had to disclose the nature of Dr. 
Lipman's rebuttal testimony until argument on the issue is held, we have made these disclosures as a 
courtesy to you and out of a sense of fair play. 
From: Steven J. Hippler [mailto:sjh@givenspursley.com] 
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 11:03 AM 
To: Byron Foster; ked@hallfarley.com; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us 
Subject: RE: SCHMECHEL 
Byron, we will object to this proposed rebuttal testimony. It is testimony Dr. Lipman provided in direct and 
discussed ad nausiaum. The judge has also indicated that there has been more than enough testimony regarding 
pharmacokinetics, graphs and serum levels. It is not only improper cummulative testimony, it is not proper 
rebuttal. It is part of what you had to prove in your case in chief, and part of what you had Dr. Lipman testify about 
for the better part of 2 days. I just wanted to let you know our position before you expend the money to have him 
come here only to have our objection sustained. 
Steven J. Hippler 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
601 W. Bannock 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 388-1200 
sjh@givenspursley.com 
From: Byron Foster [mailto:byron@bvfoster.com] 
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 10:38 AM 
To: ked@hallfarley.com; Steven J. Hippler; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us 
Subject: SCHMECHEL 
Counsel: 
I want to inform you that we intend to call Dr. Lipman in rebuttal. The rebuttal will be limited to the 
testimony of Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare regarding the graph that Mr. Hippler drew and the testimony 
that at a 30 mg dose, the therapeutic line will never be crossed. 
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